

# Journal of the Royal Society of Arts

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## *OPENING MEETING OF THE 203<sup>RD</sup> SESSION*

The Opening Meeting of the 203rd Session will take place on Wednesday, 7th November, at 2.30 p.m. The Inaugural Address, entitled 'Whither Design? a Layman's View', will be delivered by Dr. Robert W. Holland, O.B.E., M.A., M.Sc., Chairman of Council.

After the address, silver medals awarded for papers read during last session, and other awards, will be presented by the Chairman, and at the conclusion of these formal proceedings tea will be served in the Library. It is hoped that Fellows will be able to take this opportunity to meet the Chairman and Members of the Council.

## *'PERILS AND PROSPECTS IN TOWN AND COUNTRY'*

Invitations have now been sent out for the Conference under the above title which the Society will hold, as already announced, on 31st October, 1956. They have been sent to over one hundred organizations with a particular interest in protecting and improving the appearance of our towns and countryside, including government departments, other public bodies, local authorities and societies. The invitations have emphasized that the main purpose of the Conference will broadly be to draw attention to the work of the many voluntary societies which are already dealing with special aspects of the problem; to emphasize the part which every individual can take in helping to solve it; to consider any points at which additional safeguards are needed, and to discuss how public interest and concern may be increased.

Copies of the programme for the Conference may be obtained on application to the Deputy Secretary. The following have agreed to take part either by reading papers or by presiding at the various sessions: Sir Patrick Abercrombie, Mr. John Betjeman, Lady Brunner, Sir Hugh Casson, the Earl of Euston, Mr. S. A. Sadler Forster, Dr. W. G. Hoskins, Sir Geoffrey Hutchinson, Mr. G. A. Jellicoe,

Mr. Henry Morris, Mr. Peter Shepherd and Sir Stephen Tallents, the chairman of the organizing committee.

Fellows who are interested in attending the Conference should apply to the Deputy Secretary by Monday, 8th October, 1956: but as it is anticipated that a considerable number of Fellows may wish to attend it is unlikely that space will permit of the issue of more than single tickets, and it may prove necessary to hold a ballot.

### THE SOCIETY'S CHRISTMAS CARD

An order form for the Society's Christmas Card is included at the end of this issue of the *Journal*. A specimen card can be seen at the Society's House, or sent on request.

### INDUSTRIAL ART BURSARIES COMPETITION

As was announced in the last issue of the *Journal*, the exhibition of designs submitted in the 1955 Industrial Art Bursaries Competition opens to-day at the Birmingham College of Art and Crafts, Margaret Street, Birmingham, 3, where it will remain until 15th October.

### PROGRAMME OF SESSIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

It is expected that the first issue of the list of arrangements for the forthcoming session, will be enclosed with the issue of the *Journal* on 26th October.

### ERRATA

The following corrections should be made to the lecture on 'The Life and Works of Sir Joshua Reynolds', by Allan Gwynne-Jones, D.S.O., A.R.A., which was published in the *Journal* for 31st August:

Page 797, paragraph 3, line 3, for 'Lodovica' read 'Ludovico'.

Page 801, paragraph 4, line 10, should begin 'his most hostile critic'.

Page 804, paragraph 6, lines 3 to 6, should read:

'... the painting of subjects of "universal concern", such as "early education" and the "usual course of reading" have made familiar, as he maintained, without vulgarizing them; for example, the great events of Greek and Roman history, scripture and the great works of literature'.

*Three Cantor Lectures on*

## RECENT STUDIES OF SOCIOLOGY

### I. CLASS CONFLICT AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

*by*

*T. S. SIMEY, M.A.,*

*Charles Booth Professor of Social Science of the University  
of Liverpool, delivered to the Society on Monday, 7th May,  
1956, with R. W. Holland, O.B.E., M.A., M.Sc., LL.D.,  
Chairman of the Council of the Society, in the Chair*

THE CHAIRMAN: The Cantor Lectures, as you may be aware, are usually a series of three and they are generally parallel with the university type of lecture, in which we allow the lecturer to come in, say his piece, collect his papers, say good evening, and leave. The subject of this series, however, is a little unusual at the Royal Society of Arts and it forms a body of knowledge, and would-be knowledge, that often causes questions. So I have taken it upon myself, as Chairman of Council of the Royal Society of Arts, to take the chair this evening for Professor Simey, Charles Booth Professor of Social Science of the University of Liverpool, who is going to give the first of this series which, as a whole, is entitled 'Recent Studies of Sociology'. His share is to deal with class conflict and social mobility. We are keeping as nearly as possible to the form which the Cantor Lectures usually take, that is, they are not thrown open for discussion; but should anyone wish to have clarification by means of question and answer, Professor Simey will be prepared, within limits, to give us a little longer than the usual time for these lectures.

*The following lecture was then delivered:*

#### THE LECTURE

This lecture is intended to serve as an interim report on work that is being carried out in this country on the analysis of the class structure of our society, with special relation to mobility and conflict. It is therefore in the nature of a general survey rather than a final summing up. Furthermore, it is not thought that this is either the time or place to enter into a discussion of the significance of the terms 'class', 'conflict' or 'class conflict', any of which would provide adequate material for a series of lectures. But it is necessary to start by outlining briefly the hypotheses which are relevant to the work now being carried out.

In the first place, there is the notion that our society is, as it were, 'class bound', that less mobility between the classes takes place with us than in the United States or in Russia (I hope I am not offending any Marxist listeners by using the term 'class' in this sense in regard to the U.S.S.R.). This, it is supposed by some, is placing us at a disadvantage in the world of business and international affairs; we need all the ability we can get, and much of it, so it is

argued, is running to waste when able people are restricted to occupations in which they cannot use it. We are, admittedly, the last country in the world in which a genuine aristocracy exists. To an intelligent foreigner observer, such as Dr. Dibelius, it is the 'Gentleman ideal' which is typical of British national life.<sup>1</sup> It has many undoubted virtues, but we pay a price for it, in so far as the educational system which perpetuates it, also encourages the perpetuation of class barriers, at least at the level of the middle-middle classes and above. How far, we must ask, is this crippling our national life? What, the typical Englishman must ask, can be done about it?

Then there is the opposite hypothesis, that an increase in the amount of mobility has resulted in an undermining of the structure of our society, and has led to the creation of a mass of 'displaced persons', rootless or uprooted, who lack a secure social and psychological foundation on which to base their lives, threatened on the one hand by the competition of those who are rising past them on the ladder of social promotion, and on the other by the difficulties of establishing satisfying relations with others when they have ascended or descended it themselves. 'If everybody's somebody' it may be argued, 'then no one's anybody'.

Have we to regard our society as a highly stable one, in which classes, and the occupations associated with them, are self-recruited, or have we to look upon it, as Durkheim looked upon the industrial society of his own age, as a 'disordered dust of individuals'? Have we to assume that lack of mobility creates conflict, which is a very difficult thesis to prove, if one endeavours to base it on actual evidence? Or, on the other hand, have we to assume that the converse is true, namely, that mobility is a cause of conflict? As Professor Glass has pointed out, if an individual recognizes that 'there is some validity in the selection process which has kept him out of a grammar school', his 'feeling of resentment may be more rather than less acute'.<sup>2</sup> In other words, class distinctions may be easier to tolerate if it is obvious that there is no 'damned merit' in them. But the converse is also true, for the able working-class pupil who has to leave school because his parents cannot afford to keep him there must feel frustrated, to say the least of it, and we have to bear in mind that the number of such persons is substantial.<sup>3</sup>

These are all crude hypotheses, but our ignorance is, unfortunately, so great that the struggle to attain a higher level of sophistication in these matters is a hard one. For the most part we have to approach the problem from the point of view of examining the several occupational classifications into which those in gainful employment are divided, and it is therefore evident that, despite all the onslaughts of modern sociology and psychology, there is plenty of life left in the Marxist dog. Perhaps for that reason free use is still made of such expressions as 'the ruling class' and 'the working class', and social conflict is so often discussed in terms of these broad classes. But we must be cautious even so. Class consciousness, in the Marxist sense, has been redefined by our American colleagues as 'aggressively alienated class identification'; as such, it has been adjudged by Professor Shils to be a 'rather uncommon phenomenon, even in



modern industrial societies'. 'Normal class conflict', he adds, 'is fully compatible with a high degree of responsible citizenship, and a considerable measure of social order'.<sup>4</sup> It is therefore very welcome to us that our scanty information has been supplemented in recent years by the work of industrial sociologists, and I shall have much to say about this in the second half of my lecture.

In brief, we are concerned with the analysis of the structure of a society which still embodies many of the features of an aristocracy, but which has shown equalitarian tendencies over a long period of time which are now becoming more strongly developed. These are causing distress in many ways to many people, but they are being pursued with considerable energy and determination. For instance, even though children from middle-class homes, for one reason or another, have been found to make more successful grammar-school pupils than those from the homes of manual workers, that fact has not been allowed to exert any influence on educational policy. The Central Advisory Council for Education has told the Minister that

within the schools it is essential that nothing should be done which could give the slightest impression of favour towards children from what might be regarded as better homes. . . . We have decided that it would be wrong to adjust the machinery of selection specifically to allow for home background.<sup>5</sup>

May I now turn to the question of the amount of mobility that is observable in our society?

Recent researches have thrown more light on changes that have (or have not) taken place in recent years. In general, the results have been somewhat surprising; in reviewing Professor Glass' *Social Mobility in Britain*, for instance, Mrs. Barbara Wootton has remarked that 'the picture that emerges is, on the whole, discouraging to the complacent equalitarian';<sup>6</sup> she emphasises the importance of the finding based on these researches that 'there have been no major differences between successive generations in the overall intensity of the status association between fathers and sons',<sup>7</sup> and accepts the conclusion that 'for the contemporary adult, paternal status is still the chief factor in occupational selection'. This argument may be reinforced by quotations from *Social Mobility in Britain*.<sup>8</sup> It has, indeed been stated that 'the highest rigidity is found in the professional and high administrative *cadres*, and the least in the skilled manual and routine non-manual category'. Moreover, 'men with high status backgrounds not only tend to a very marked extent to achieve high status themselves, but to do so at an early age', whilst conversely, those who rise from low to high status occupations, if they do so at all, have to spend a longer time in the endeavour. Added to this, it has also been found that there is most exclusiveness in the marriages of individuals whose fathers were in the professional, managerial and executive grades, and least in the marriages of the sons and daughters of skilled manual and routine non-manual workers, even though there is 'now rather more marriage than formerly between partners of unequal educational backgrounds'.

The results of the work carried out under Professor Glass' direction have been summarized as follows:

the general picture so far is of a rather stable social structure, and one in which

social status tended to operate within, so to speak, a closed circuit. Social origins have conditioned educational level, and both have conditioned achieved social status.

This state of affairs is, it is thought, likely to continue,

unless there are very substantial changes in the extent of future promotion . . . changes which the existing statistics do not and cannot foreshadow;

otherwise

a major reduction in the degree of association can hardly be anticipated'.<sup>9</sup>

Whether or not these are completely satisfactory generalizations which can be based on the evidence, I must leave to others, particularly statisticians, to judge. But it is reassuring to be able to record that the material has been analysed again by Mr. Prais since the publication of *Social Mobility in Britain*, with somewhat similar results. If the present state of affairs in regard to mobility is compared with that which would obtain in a society in which 'the accident of birth' had been prevented from exercising any influence at all over status, he has calculated that a family remains in the upper classes 72 per cent longer than it would in this entirely equalitarian society; 27 per cent longer in the middle classes; and 35 per cent longer in the working classes. Mr. Prais' conclusion is that 'as far as concerns the average length of time spent by a family in a particular social class, the effects of imperfect mobility are to raise this time somewhat in the middle and lower classes, and to raise it considerably in the upper classes'.<sup>10</sup>

From the statistician's point of view, therefore, though there is evidently a great deal of mobility in our society, and it is wrong to regard the class structure as rigid, there is room for much more than exists at the present time. On the other hand, the completely equalitarian society which is used as a yardstick for purposes of comparison in Mr. Prais' analysis represents a Utopia which is very far removed from the realities of social life in any society of which we have knowledge, and, though it is legitimate to use it for comparative purposes, it must not be made the basis of criticism; still less can it be used as a foundation for public policy. On the other hand, from the sociologist's point of view, rigidities which have been shown to exist in our class structure are important phenomena which may give rise to serious anxieties and discontent, and thus ultimately to conflict of one kind or another. It is obviously true that the difficulties which have to be surmounted by an upper- or upper-middle-class boy who receives an 'independent' school education, in entering a high-status profession or occupation, are much less than those which are encountered by boys educated in grammar (or other) schools. As Mrs. Wootton points out, even in 1949 'the ex-independent school boy had still five times as good a chance of reaching the university as his ex-elementary school contemporary, while a girl's chances were twelve times better if she went to an independent instead of to an elementary school'. The situation of the children of manual workers also compares unfavourably in this respect with those of the middle-middle and lower-middle classes, who have been shown by Dr. Himmelweit to occupy almost half the grammar school places available in the country.<sup>11</sup> It has, moreover, been found that middle-class boys 'tend to have superior academic records

despite the fact that, as a group, they do not differ in measured intelligence from working-class boys in the same schools'.<sup>12</sup> The middle-class boy, therefore, has a much better chance than the sons or daughters of a manual worker of reaching the university, and as university education is closely associated with entry to the professions (and this connection has become closer in recent years) the fact that the professions are so largely self-recruited can be explained in this way; this also accounts for the self-recruitment of upper-class occupations generally, the advantages of an independent school and Oxbridge education being particularly important in this regard.

We are therefore left with a picture of an hierarchy of occupational classifications which, though not 'classes' in every sense in which that word is used, nevertheless represent social realities, in so far as they are largely associated with the distribution of power and influence in our society, and can be shown to provide a valid framework of analysis when other social phenomena, such as marriage, fertility, mortality, and morbidity are taken into consideration. Professor Glass has concluded that the statement that 'in Britain, occupation holds a central position as a means of facilitating the investigation of social status cannot be seriously challenged';<sup>13</sup> in this I can only heartily concur, and in doing so I can only remark on the presence of the shadow of Karl Marx at this meeting. But there is a great deal more to be said on the subject of the determination of the class structure, and the shaping of the behaviour, thoughts and feelings of members of classes than this statement might imply to some. Research has shown, for instance, surprisingly little consciousness of the existence of a conflict between the interests of classes amongst those who belong to them.

In the first place, we find a good deal of confusion in the minds of individuals when they are asked to state the class to which they belong. Mr. F. M. Martin found in his Greenwich and Hertford studies that, whilst the professional and managerial grades were almost unanimous in their self ratings, the salaried grades divided themselves in a ratio of about 2:1 between middle and working class.<sup>14</sup> The manual workers also divided themselves between middle and working classes, three-quarters being self-classified as working and almost one-quarter as middle class. Of a total of 862 persons, 454 attributed themselves to the middle class, and 408 to the working class, a somewhat odd result, but one which no experienced social researcher would deem very surprising. Mr. Martin summarizes his findings as follows:

It seems likely that it represents on the one hand a genuine decline, in the eyes of the working class, of the prestige of the minor non-manual occupations, rather subtly coloured by a slightly resentful attitude, which, in the course of the interviews found expression in occasional spontaneous exclamations such as 'They are no better than we are'. In the middle class, on the other hand, the tendency towards an attitude of exclusiveness conflicts with, and is partially overcome by a perhaps defensive tendency to minimize the size and importance of the working class by restricting its membership.

The 'class consciousness' of each of the five classes thus established (professional middle; salaried middle; salaried working; manual middle; and manual working) is hard to identify. When the individuals concerned were asked to

compare their children's chances of moving up in the world with their own, the results showed that the opinion of *every* class was that the child had a better opportunity than his parent, though it is significant that in the case of the professional middle class, thirty per cent considered them to be only 'as good' and 16 per cent 'not as good', proportions which were twice and three times the average for all classes. So far as satisfaction with one's work was concerned, the figures for all classes show that the majority of the members of *every* class were doing the job originally desired, and were given a 'reasonable chance' to use their abilities. Dissatisfaction was, as might be expected, highest in the manual working class, but even in this case 69 per cent considered that this 'reasonable chance' was open to them. Moreover, when the desires of parents for types of employment for their sons was investigated, as affording evidence of their own frustrated ambitions, the generalization based on American evidence that 'the lower the occupational level of the parents, the larger the proportion having aspirations for a professional career for their children' was precisely contradicted, the proportions who wished to see their children entering a profession falling steadily from the top to the lowest class.<sup>15</sup> Finally, in reply to the question 'do class interests conflict?' the majority of every class except one answered 'No', the exception being the manual working class of whom 52 per cent answered 'Yes'.<sup>16</sup>

The problem of class-identification and class conflict has also been examined from the point of view of voting behaviour. In his work on *The Middle Class Vote*, Mr. John Bonham has concluded that, of the votes cast in the General Election of 1951, about half the Conservative votes and four-fifths of the Labour votes came from manual workers. Both the Conservative and Labour parties were supported by several classes; whilst three out of four Conservative voters were found to be 'of inferior status' and the party was thus nearer to an even balance of social class in its supporters than Labour, the possibility of victory for the Labour party was dependent on winning the franchises of the middle class. It can therefore be concluded that neither party rested solely on the support of a single class, and that there was not much to choose between the parties 'as a reflection of the class position in the nation as a whole', though the Conservative party had 'more than the national average of the middle class among its supporters, and the Labour party more in proportion of the working class'.<sup>17</sup>

On the other hand, party choice is closely associated with occupational classification, and this holds true of both manual and non-manual workers: the lower down the income scale we go, the higher the percentage of Labour voters. The percentages voting Conservative in the sample studied by Mr. Bonham fall steadily from 87 per cent in the case of 'proprietors' to 26 per cent in that of 'very poor manual' workers. Subsequent work has also suggested that the correspondence may well become closer when the comparative 'newness' of the Labour party wears off. It has been suggested that the tendency for lower proportions of older than of younger manual workers to vote Labour—the so-called 'age effect'—arises from a disposition for voters to vote according to a 'party image', favourable or unfavourable to the class or group with which an



individual identifies himself, 'deeply rooted in the elector's social environment and past experiences'. This factor necessarily operates in favour of the Conservative party; it will in due course be neutralized as time goes on, and all voters have had the same chances to form 'party images' of both parties in their youth. But it may also in part be

attributable to a reluctance of voters who have become objectively working class to vote Labour instead of Conservative, although a movement to a higher objective social class may cause a voter to change more readily from Labour to Conservative.

and in so far as this is true, class mobility may operate against the interests of the Labour party.<sup>18</sup> It has also been demonstrated that there is a close relationship between bad living conditions and family income which are, again, closely associated with occupational classification, and are reflected in the percentage of the electorate who voted Labour in County Boroughs in four General Elections which took place between 1931 and 1950.<sup>19</sup> Whatever may be the degree of association between class and voting, demonstrated in the fact that 'there is a sharp class division in the way people vote',<sup>19a</sup> the structure of the British political system and the ideas and aspirations of British voters are such that neither the Conservative nor the Labour party can be said to be a 'class' party, in the sense that it is supported by one or other of the classes and dominated by their interests.

Nevertheless, whether or not class conflicts are reflected in political behaviour and the structure of political institutions, or *vice versa*, the sociologist must admit that conflicts of interest between classes do exist, and endeavour to examine the realities of the world around him. I therefore propose to examine the problem from the point of view of the upper and middle classes, and the working class or manual workers, in turn.

*The Upper Class.* Unfortunately, the sociologist has little to say about this class that can be based on recent research, however much he may actually say in fact. Sociology is quite definitely a 'Non-U' activity, and sociologists are, predominantly, 'Non-Uers'. Sociology is (unlike Social Anthropology, which is, in the main, based on enquiries conducted on peoples other than ourselves) unknown in Oxbridge; it is perhaps a significant fact in this regard that, out of eight professors now holding Chairs at Redbrick in Sociology, Social Science, and so on, only two were educated at independent or 'public' schools, and soon there will be only one. We therefore have little contact with the upper classes, who would regard the methods of investigation which we use on the 'simpler' peoples of Bechuanaland and Bootle and on university students—the cannon-fodder of the social scientists—with considerable amusement, as has been the experience of my own family when we found ourselves included in the sample of a market research organization, and were subjected to interviews by young ladies.

By and large, however, we can only regard the English upper classes as a most remarkable social phenomenon. Despite taxation, death duties, agricultural legislation and confinement in the House of Lords, the aristocracy has remained



an extraordinarily influential class. Their political power is still immense. All the hindsight which Bernard Shaw directed towards them when he wrote the Preface to *Man and Superman* some fifty years ago has justified itself as a prophecy; the influence of the Court, moreover, with which the aristocracy is closely connected, shows no signs whatever of diminution. The 'Gentleman ideal' still thrives, nourished by the example of many of these symbolic figures. I cannot but remark on the importance of these facts, even though I may get into trouble with some of my more equalitarian colleagues by doing so. The only really precise thing that we know about the upper classes is that if an upper class family is demoted it takes it 16 generations to climb up again—a piece of information that I find somewhat bewildering.<sup>10</sup>

*The Middle Classes.* As middle-class people, we have been able to get to know a lot more about the middle classes. We have little to complain about on the score of the blocking of the channels of promotion, unless we are wrestling with an urgent desire to sit in the House of Lords—and even then things are not anything like as difficult for us as they used to be a hundred years ago. The route from the grammar school is now as open to Oxbridge as it is to Redbrick, and from then on it leads almost anywhere. The middle classes mix with the upper in the independent schools and at Oxbridge, and with the lower in the grammar schools. If there is a block, however, it is represented by the independent or public school, now securely entrenched in our social structure behind long waiting lists.<sup>20</sup> It is only the exceptional middle-class family that can take the possibility seriously into consideration of sending more than one son still less more than one daughter) to these schools.

Middle-class professions and occupations are largely self-recruited,<sup>21</sup> and the class as a whole is therefore maintaining its position in our society. The chief exception is the Civil Service, in which the higher posts are now filled to a much larger extent than in the inter-war period by promotion from the lower grades.<sup>21a</sup> A contrary tendency is, however, rapidly setting in in industry, which is due to the expansion in the numbers of managers, professional and scientific workers, and salaried administrators. From the middle-class point of view, this has created many new posts, and has opened up a large number of old ones which have hitherto been filled by upper-class or upper middle-class persons with money and influence, or by promotion from the ranks. The modern tendency requires training for these posts, and demands appropriate university or professional qualifications from those appointed to them.

Work carried out by my colleague, Dr. Scott, and those associated with him, has shown that the managers employed in a steel works he has studied have been subject to influences of this kind in marked degree. Those in employment in 1954 can be contrasted with those employed in 1935. The total numbers of managers rose from 42 to 115; those who entered from 'outside' rose from three to 37, and the numbers of those with university and professional education from three to 31.<sup>22</sup> The scales are now heavily loaded in favour of those with professional and technical qualifications, and these can now only be obtained by a restricted section of the rank and file, such as the laboratory assistant and

the craftsman. Moreover, the middle classes are in a very favourable position to acquire these qualifications at universities and schools of technology, for it is a remarkable fact that since 1938 grammar school leavers have shown a greater interest in industrial occupations and less in clerical and administrative posts, the figure rising by 1947 from 17 to 22.5 per cent in the case of the former, and falling in that of the latter from 40.7 to 26.7 per cent.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, this means that most rank and file workers will probably have to restrict their aspirations to foremen's and supervisors' posts, and I shall have more to say about that later on. In general, the 'manual worker' as a class will tend to be confronted with a management and administrative *élite*, whose self-consciousness and willingness to take protective action as a group is steadily increasing, as in the case of doctors and teachers.

Furthermore, the middle classes have taken full advantage of the opportunities made available to them by recent changes in the educational system. The middle-class pupil does well in the grammar school, largely by reason of his home background, and the informal education he gets both in his family and in the neighbourhood in which he lives. Middle-class parents attach high value to education, and are prepared to undergo great sacrifices to obtain it for their children. There is a steady decline in the academic record of grammar school pupils down the social scale,<sup>24</sup> which must be attributed to social influences. Children of manual workers, though they may compare favourably on the basis of psychological tests with middle-class children, leave school earlier, and want to leave earlier. The culture of the middle-class home, in fact, is much more in keeping with the grammar school than that of the manual worker; this (and the question of the maintenance grant) are the core of the problem of 'parity of prestige', in so far as that confronts the grammar school.

On the other hand, the middle classes pay a high price for their educational and other opportunities in the Welfare State and the new industrial world of technology and full employment. The competition for grammar-school places is severe, and failure to obtain one either imposes severe burdens on the middle-class family (impossible burdens where there are several children), or involves social degrading. Professor Glass writes:

'Concern to ensure a rise, or at least prevent a fall in status, is part of the 'anxiety neurosis' so evident in middle-class parents' aspirations for their children and in the willingness of the parents to make very substantial sacrifices so long as their children can obtain the kind of education which connotes relatively high future status'.<sup>25</sup>

But the problem has hitherto been ignored by the social scientist, though one may wonder why.

*Manual Workers.* The generalization that the lines between the middle classes and the working classes are now exceedingly ill-defined, and are steadily becoming more blurred every day, has been made so often that it is trite; it certainly needs no further elaboration by me on this occasion. But surprisingly few attempts have been made to follow it up, and establish with greater clarity precisely how

the distinctions have lost sharpness, how far new sub-classes have come into being, and what relations have been established between them.

The point has been made by Dr. Halsey that the classifications which were used as a framework of analysis in *Social Mobility in Britain* were very general; they are, he suggests,

not classes in the classical sense, nor are they functional groups. They certainly form a hierarchy of prestige . . . but, in particular, Category 5 includes both routine non-manual and skilled manual workers, thus concealing what normally would be considered to be social mobility between groups—which, in any case are shown by the studies of the educational system to differ in important respects in their beliefs and attitudes.<sup>26</sup>

It is therefore necessary to supplement recent work on social mobility with such material as can be extracted from other studies, carried out with different objectives in view, if the subtleties of social relationships and something of the social psychology of sub-classes are to be understood.

In general, the latter studies follow the classic lines of analysis laid down by Durkheim in his *Division of Labour*. Increasing differentiation and specialization in manufacturing processes have led to the multiplication of interests and allegiances amongst the members of the groups concerned, and the growth of more complex relationships between them. For instance, as has already been pointed out, the growing separation of ownership from control has in many firms left the latter in the hands of professional managers, who may have no economic link whatever with the business except the salaries they earn. So far as manual workers and the classes most closely associated with them are concerned, there is evidence that an 'independent group consciousness' is developing amongst foremen and supervisors, which corresponds with a similar process applying to the managers, as their rôle becomes increasingly differentiated from that of the latter, and the owners of the undertakings.<sup>27</sup>

This may be reflected in an assumption of superior status by foremen and supervisors when they are brought into contact with manual workers in everyday social life outside the factory, though the latter may be unwilling to reciprocate by conferring it on them, so that the foremen and supervisors may be forced into social isolation; it has for instance been found that they have been rejected as leaders of social activities on a housing estate.<sup>28</sup> In the long run, however, this tendency may be neutralized. Foremen and supervisors have shown signs of going their own way and striking out in a new direction *vis-à-vis* management, which may bring them into closer relations with manual workers; in particular, unionization is making headway amongst them, and the training schemes which have been set up for their benefit may have the effect of identifying them clearly as a separate class, a tendency which is accentuated by the growth of external recruitment into the ranks of management.

The closer relationship between foremen and supervisors, and workers, may also obtain at work. In the docks industry, for example, dock workers are prone to build up good relationships with their foremen, though this is partly due to the special characteristics of both the formal and the informal structure of their

industry, which permits the making of relations between foremen and dock workers which are wholly or mainly voluntary. But it is important to note that this may have unexpected results, in so far as the aggressiveness latent in authority relationships may be directed towards middle management, with whom the workers' relations are impersonal; improved relations with the foremen may be accompanied by a worsening of relations with their immediate superiors. Even more surprising phenomena may be observed. It is particularly interesting that the attitudes of the dock workers in Manchester to the managing director of the Ship Canal Company were found to be exceptionally favourable. He, unlike his colleagues, was always referred to either by his full Christian name and surname, or as the 'Head of the Canal'. He appeared, indeed, to be immune from direct criticism; he was identified with the dock workers' point of view, and the decisions taken by the company to which they objected were attributed to bad advice which he received from his subordinates.<sup>29</sup> This opens up a new conception of the rôles of 'top and middle management' in industry, and of industrial organization generally from the point of view of the maintenance of good relations.

Durkheim saw clearly that the stability of an industrial society depended on the recognition of the kind of 'organic solidarity' implicit in the foregoing argument; since occupations and rôles were becoming increasingly differentiated they must, he thought, necessarily become more interdependent and essential to each other. But this organic solidarity would, he thought, only be possible if all the members of the society concerned continued to accept much the same scale of values, an outcome which advancing specialization itself appeared to make unlikely. The importance of this problem has become very apparent in the results of the researches carried out by Dr. Scott and his colleagues in my own Department. Over and over again, for instance, cleavages are found to exist between the outlook and interests of craftsmen and process workers, and their representatives. The historical roots of this cleavage are to be found in the decline in the security and status of craftsmen that became acute some thirty years ago with the breakdown of skilled jobs and the advent of the dilution of skilled labour. The craftsmen's position was also threatened by the unionization of process workers, particularly when the latter began to feel that they rather than the craftsmen had begun to call the tune.<sup>30</sup> This tendency was noticed as early as 1923 by Professor G. D. H. Cole in his *Workshop Organization*.

Recent changes in industrial organization, particularly the advent of automatic processes of production and instrumentation, have swung the pendulum back towards the craftsmen, unfortunately without healing the split between craftsmen and process workers, however. One of the conclusions that have emerged from an analysis of the occupational structure of a steel plant, recently completed by my colleagues, is that the most significant change has been in the expansion of the administrative and craft *cadres*, whilst the process workers have declined in relative importance. The number of craftsmen and administrative staff employed in the firm as a whole represented seven per cent and four per cent of the total in 1925; these figures increased to 11 per cent in each case in 1953.



In the department in which technical change had proceeded with greatest rapidity, the corresponding figures for craftsmen were four per cent in 1938, and ten per cent in 1946. These percentages represented increases which considerably exceeded the rates of expansion of other categories of employees. This has brought a renewed self-awareness and consciousness of possession of power to the craftsmen. They are, in fact, suffering from strongly-felt grievances which are bringing them into conflict both with their fellow-workers and with management, and serious industrial unrest is arising out of this. They often earn less, in fact, than the man whose machines they instal and service, although their numbers and importance have increased; this they feel is only being recognized slowly and grudgingly by their employers and by other unions, and almost every craft shop steward whose opinions have been sought by my colleagues has stated that the craftsman is merely regarded as a 'necessary evil' by his fellow-workers as well as by management. But they also thought that the outlook and interests of process workers differ so much from those of craftsmen that little support could ever be expected from them.<sup>31</sup>

Survey work carried out on housing estates has, nevertheless, failed to establish a distinction from the point of view of either self-conferred or attributed status, as between skilled and unskilled workers. A Liverpool investigation, for instance, has shown that the assumption of status was no more frequent amongst the former than the latter; this was regarded as snobbish behaviour by both types of worker. The only valid distinction, in fact, was between 'roughs' and 'respectables', and depended on differences in value and in culture which do not seem to be directly associated with skill.<sup>32</sup> Skilled and unskilled alike can, if they will, join the ranks of the 'respectables'. If they do so, social mobility is likely to result, but only of the 'inter-generational' kind, because there is good reason to believe that one factor leading to the adoption of a 'superior' style of life is the conscious desire to provide the environment in which aspirations to social advancement can be realised through or for one's children. It is of interest in this connection that a marked relationship has been found to exist between types of home life and a child's academic and hence social success.<sup>33</sup>

Even the skilled worker's child finds himself at a disadvantage in the struggle up the ladder. He might have special advantages at a technical school, but, in general, more manual workers say they prefer secondary grammar school education for their children, even though, as has been pointed out above, those who have been brought up in a middle-class environment are better adapted to it. Nearly half have, in fact, been found to prefer secondary grammar education, as compared with under a quarter who prefer the secondary technical school.<sup>34</sup> The better off the individual, and the better his own education, the more pronounced the preference. This may be a reflection, no doubt, of the fact that the secondary technical school has failed to fulfil the hopes held out for it. It has been pointed out, indeed, that there has been 'no great expansion of technical education at the secondary level', and, what is more significant, the new schools have not as yet carved out for themselves a distinctive and essential rôle in the tripartite division.<sup>35</sup> The theoretical justification for this division rests on the



assumption that three psychological types can be identified for which they can cater; this assumption is, to say the least of it, shaky, and the three types have in fact developed as a social hierarchy. No wonder, then, that manual workers have preferred that which has been generally considered to be best for their children. The significance of the foregoing argument can be summarized as follows:

The upper classes have maintained their position in our society with reasonable success; if a sociologist may be permitted to stray from the 'strait and narrow path between right and wrong' for a moment, and hazard a value judgment, there can be little doubt that our society has gained from this, in stability at least.

The middle classes have also maintained their position surprisingly well. It has been a struggle for many, but the opening up of the managerial profession, and the development of technology, may make things much easier in the future for the boys and girls who have been unable in recent years to obtain places in grammar schools. Many middle-class children already receive technical education; some are admitted to the relatively small number of technical schools now available, many more become pupils in technical colleges. There is no reason why more should not follow their example in the future. If this relieves anxieties and robs extremist political movements of potential support, so much the better.

The position of manual workers is much harder to understand. There is much mobility upwards, but it is a two-way process, acting in the downward direction as well. Mr. Prais has produced evidence which suggests that a working-class family which rises in the social scale tends to return to it within three generations—clogs to clogs, as we say in Lancashire. Whether that is a Good or Bad Thing, I do not profess to say at this time and place.

Future prospects in the matter of what may be termed long-range mobility seem to lie with the secondary technical schools, and the technical colleges and colleges of advanced technology. If the culture of the grammar schools is to some extent foreign to that of the manual workers, there is no reason why this should also be so of the technical schools; in fact, there is every reason why it should *not* be so. But much will have to be accomplished before a new and more easily navigated channel of advancement can be opened up. My colleague Dr. Olive Banks has pointed out that 'it is the vocational qualification of the academic curriculum that enables it to exert such a pressure on all forms of secondary education' and it is because secondary education has been 'profoundly influenced by its *rôle* in selection for social mobility' that it has played a relatively passive *rôle* in conditioning the development of society. 'Even in technical education', she adds, 'an academic grounding is a pre-requisite for promotion to the higher posts, a factor which goes a long way to explain the struggles of the junior technical school to outlive its proletarian origins'.

Like Dr. Banks, I can only conclude that 'parity of esteem' in education is likely to prove an elusive goal as long as the social system is dominated by material values. Like her, I can only see the movement towards educational equality as dependent, in the last resort, on the wider social movements of our

time. But our world has great need of the technician, and it is he, personified by Bernard Shaw in *Man and Superman* as Enry Straker, who may take advantage of new opportunities and create something of a new deal. Even if he may not completely realize Mr. H. G. Wells' anticipation of the efficient engineering class which will, he hope (so Shaw said), 'finally sweep the jabberers out of the way of civilization', Enry Straker may at least win an opportunity for us—and himself—to think again.

Anything which prevents the continued misuse of the grammar school, primarily an educational institution, as a mere ladder of social advancement, is to be welcomed. Anything which lowers its prestige, falsely gained in this way, is to be encouraged. But until something can be done to achieve this end by way of convincing our fellow-citizens that, as Professor Glass points out, 'there are other ways of serving the community than occupying posts attracting high social status', and that 'there should be, correspondingly, other paths to social prestige', little will be accomplished.

May I add this by way of conclusion. The consciousness of belonging to a class, and of having relations—good and bad—with members of other classes, and of placing yourself in a rank order in this way, is deeply buried in the texture of our personalities.<sup>37</sup> When expelled by equalitarians, the idea re-emerges, sometimes in strange ways, as many have noted in Israel in recent years. It is hard to say where we are going at the moment. Professor Marshall has referred to the way in which his namesake, Professor Alfred Marshall, posed the question: which, he thought was not 'whether all men will ultimately be equal—that they certainly will not—but whether progress may not go on steadily, if not slowly, till, by occupation at least, every man is a gentleman'.<sup>38</sup> But this introduces us to a third hypothesis, namely, that (as Professor T. H. Marshall puts it) 'there is a kind of basic human equality, associated with full community membership, which is not inconsistent with a superstructure of economic inequality'.<sup>39</sup> That hypothesis, however, must be left for further examination, I hope on some occasion in the not too far distant future, by this Society.

*There being no questions a vote of thanks to the Lecturer was carried with acclamation, and the meeting then ended.*

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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## II. SOME ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOGRAPHY

by

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*Professor of Sociology, University of London, at the  
London School of Economics, delivered to the  
Society on Monday, 14th May, 1956, with Sir  
Ernest Goodale, C.B.E., M.C., a Vice-President  
of the Society, in the Chair*

THE CHAIRMAN: This is the second of the series of three Cantor Lectures on 'Recent Studies of Sociology'. The lecture is entitled 'Some Aspects of the Development of Demography', a subject of which I know nothing, but I am hoping to learn something from our lecturer.

He is Professor Glass, Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics. He has written a lot of books and papers on and around this, to me, very abstruse subject, but which I have no doubt is as clear as crystal to most of you. In any case I cannot imagine anybody more qualified to talk to us on this subject than Professor Glass, and I now ask him to deliver his lecture:

*The following lecture was then delivered:*

### THE LECTURE

When I was invited to talk to your Society on some aspect of demography, the topic first suggested was 'changes in the size and composition of the population'. I must confess that I felt slightly chilled by the prospect. The effects upon numbers and age structure of changes in family size and in mortality have been discussed in many admirable studies in recent years. To repeat the broad findings here would be superfluous, while a detailed examination would be more suitable for a paper in a technical journal than for a public lecture. I was therefore delighted when your Secretary allowed me to take up a different topic—to say something about the development of demography itself, of the study of the vital events of a society, rather than about any particular set of demographic findings. If I were asked to justify my choice, I should have to admit that, in a large measure, I am simply being selfish—that it is a matter of my interest in the history of ideas. But there is a little more to it than that. It is almost 300 years since John Graunt, the London draper who became a Fellow of the Royal Society, founded what we now call demography, though it took a nineteenth-century Frenchman to find the appropriate Greek term for it.<sup>1</sup> It is not entirely irrelevant, even from the practical point of view, to see how the subject has changed over that period. So, drawing largely upon what has happened in Britain, I shall try to give a few illustrations of the way in which, during the past 300 years, demography has adapted itself to changes in the

availability of the basic data it uses, in the breadth of experience of using those data, and in the population situation itself.

Some of the qualities which made Graunt not only a pioneer demographer but also a great one were his concentration upon the empirical data at hand, however faulty they might be; his ability to pose questions which were highly specific; and his relative freedom from a desire to speculate in an uncontrolled manner on universals or to use his analysis to 'justify God's ways to man'. He was not completely exempt from these latter tendencies. Having regard to his epoch, he could scarcely have been expected to refrain from calculating that

... one couple, *viz.*, Adam and Eve, doubling themselves every 64 years of the 5610 years which is the *age* of the World, according to the *Scriptures*, shall produce far more People then are now in it. Wherefore the World is not above 100 thousand years old, as some vainly Imagine, nor above what the *Scripture* makes it.<sup>2</sup>

But in general, he was not given to the fault for which he criticized 'speculative men', few of whom 'truly study *Nature and Things*. The more ingenious not advancing much further then to write, and speak wittily about these matters'.<sup>3</sup>

There were also other contemporaries who, like Graunt, knew the difference between instructed imagination and idle speculation. Halley was such a person. Graunt first put forward the idea of a life table—a table which shows chances of a group of new-born babies surviving to various ages—but his table was nearly imaginary.<sup>4</sup> Halley made only one contribution to demography, but that single effort in 1693 turned Graunt's nearly imaginary life table into a nearly real one, and laid the foundations of modern actuarial analysis.<sup>5</sup> Gregory King, also writing in the 1690s, was not so widely different in calibre—indeed, as a demographer he deserves far more to be ranked with Graunt than does Petty. And there were the less distinguished contributors of the eighteenth century, also attempting to deal with empirical data: Richard Price, for example—more justifiably famous in another field—who knew what data were needed for constructing an accurate life table, even though he himself over-estimated the level of mortality in England; and William Wales and John Howlett, who used something approaching a sampling technique in their attempts to measure the course of the population during the century.

But there were also writers who were concerned, in a different way, with the regularities revealed by demographic analysis—who saw in them evidence of the design of providence, or who assumed that they were reflections of a constancy of behaviour over time and space, so that, so to speak, a sample of one would suffice for all. The sex ratio of births and its constancy was a favoured topic for such speculation. Graunt himself had argued that, with the relative equality in the numbers of males and females in the population, '*Christian Religion*, prohibiting *Polygamy*, is more agreeable to the *Law of Nature*, that is, the *Law of God*, than *Mahumetism*, and others, that allow it'.<sup>6</sup> For John Arbuthnot, another Fellow of the Royal Society, the very constancy over a period of years of the sex ratio at birth was 'an Argument for Divine Providence'. And the actual ratio of males to females in the population demonstrated that



Polygamy is contrary to the Law of Nature and Justice, and to the Propagation of the Human Race; for when Males and Females are in equal number, if one Man takes Twenty Wives, Nineteen Men must live in Celibacy, which is repugnant to the Design of Nature. . . .<sup>7</sup>

And so also—and even more so—with Derham, the author of *Physico-Theology*, for whom all demographic phenomena were testimony to the harmonious design of the Creator.<sup>8</sup> With Süssmilch, too, in Prussia, similar views of the Divine Order prompted the vast compilation of birth, marriage and death statistics which he drew from many sources.<sup>9</sup> Equally, there were many writers who were prepared to draw the widest generalizations from very small and extremely odd collections of instances. Perhaps the only example I need mention at this point by way of illustration is that cited without comment by Joshua Milne, the distinguished actuary who constructed the first English life table which linked together both population and vital statistics. The case was of an eighteenth-century German mathematician, J. H. Lambert, who, drawing upon Süssmilch's statistics for Brandenburg and London, essayed to 'exhibit the law of mortality which prevails among mankind in general' and apparently arrived at an expectation of life at birth of 29 years.<sup>10</sup>

I am not trying to poke fun at these earlier demographers. They worked in very difficult circumstances. The data they used were limited and defective. Because the subject of demography itself was relatively young, experience of handling vital statistics was very limited, and the techniques of measurement and analysis available were by no means always beyond reproach. The search for regularities was pressed beyond the validity of the materials and the appropriateness of the techniques. But the search itself helped to provide better materials and better techniques, and regularities in mortality and fertility were later shown to exist, even though they were sometimes different from those which had been envisaged by the pioneers. At the same time, even with the beginnings of wider experience, some part of the earlier assumptions of regularities and constants spilled over into later work, and it is worth giving one or two examples.

One instance can be seen in the first of our periodic censuses, that taken in 1801. John Rickman was in charge, as he was at the next three censuses, and he appears to have been an enthusiastic and able administrator. He tried out methods of tabulating the entries in parish registers, and when, in 1830, he thought of amplifying the detail collected on the occupations of the people, he apparently organized two pilot investigations to see what difficulties might arise in practice. But he had his weak points. The first census was taken not simply to count the number of people in Britain in 1801, but also—because of the population controversy of the 1780s—to throw light upon the way the population had grown during the eighteenth century. For this latter purpose the clergy were required to extract and list the baptisms, burials and marriages in their parishes for each of a considerable number of years from 1700 to 1800. Knowing the population in 1801 and the average number of baptismal entries per year for the period 1796–1800, Rickman asked: 'If 255,426 Baptisms . . . were produced from a Population of 9,168,000, from what Population were 152,540 (the Baptisms of

1700) produced?', and the answer, by simple rule of proportion, was 5·475 millions.<sup>11</sup> The population at each intervening point of time was estimated in the same way. But this, of course, assumes in effect that the national birth rate was a constant—unchanging over the previous century. Hence even if William Morgan, the contemporary actuary, was grinding an axe in memory of his uncle, Richard Price, the leading figure in the eighteenth-century population controversy, he had a genuine axe to grind when he said that the 1801 census 'appears to have been instituted for the mere purpose of determining a controversy; and even in this it has totally failed of its object'.<sup>12</sup>

The discussions preceding the 1831 census—the last taken by Rickman—yield three distinct and rather more interesting instances of the influence of eighteenth-century traditions on the progress of demography. Parliament had set up a committee to consider what types of question should be included in the census schedule, and the minutes show that one difficulty had been raised by Rickman. In 1821, for the first time, the census had asked for the ages of the people. The question was not a compulsory one, but some 88 per cent of the people had complied. There had obviously been some desire to repeat the question in 1831, but Rickman was opposed to it. The question had been asked once already; presumably that was sufficient. This was certainly the implication, for Rickman asked whether a repetition of the question would be 'likely to produce information of such value as to justify the expense of the inquiry'. Moreover—and he said this explicitly—if it were a matter of calculating the duration of human life and the monetary value of insurances, this could be dealt with directly because since 1812 age at death had been recorded in the parish registers. That is, he was thinking in traditional terms of life tables constructed exclusively from death statistics, although the professionals knew that such tables were accurate only if the population could be assumed to be stationary. The most Rickman was prepared to do was to ask specifically for the numbers of males under and over twenty years of age.

The Committee took expert advice and asked for a comment from Joshua Milne, the actuary of the Sun Life Office. But perhaps Milne was not accustomed to deal with amateurs. His reply contained too many qualifications, too much insistence upon a high level of accuracy in death registration as well as upon the enumeration of the ages of the living. He really wanted a kind of sample investigation of deaths, in which the more restricted coverage would ensure the much greater reliability of each unit of information collected. And the letter in which these demands were made was not exactly clear or to the point. Rickman, on the other hand, could certainly write. His own reply, though largely irrelevant, was quite devastating. He concluded:

I have often wondered that the Life Assurance Offices in London have never combined in collecting facts (such as Mr. Milne desiderates) as a sound Basis of Calculation for their own purposes; an enquiry of this kind would be agreeably compatible with the Autumn Vacation of their Clerks. . . . Calculators of the Duration and Value of Lives must rely on common-place materials, or obtain materials fashioned to their own purposes by their own labour: the common Lot of Mankind.<sup>13</sup>

I am not aware of any further comment by Milne. Rickman had gained the day but he was not yet through with his constants. In the final census schedule, enumerators were asked to specify the numbers of males over twenty years of age. They were told, however, that if this number

should differ materially (or otherwise, as compared to the Returns of 1821) from One Half the Total Number of Males . . ., some Error has probably been committed, and the Answer to this Question should be examined, and corrected, if necessary.

Assumptions had won and consistency with the earlier results had been assured.

In reality, however, Rickman's victory was only a short-term one, for from 1841 onwards ages have been ascertained at each census. Indeed, the outstanding characteristic of nineteenth-century demography was the systematic building up of details, derived from regular records of populations and of the vital events occurring to them. Less and less came to be taken for granted, at least in the sense in which that phrase applies to some of the earlier demographers. Age composition might move slowly or even remain unchanged. But that was a possibility to be tested by periodic census analysis, not an *a priori* assumption which obviated the need for such examinations. And the regularities of mortality, if such existed, were also to be ascertained by detailed analysis, not 'built into' the initial calculations. Constants are still sometimes used to-day. But they have been arrived at in a different manner, being based upon the scrutiny of a wide variety of actual populations, so that the probable range of variation can be tested.<sup>14</sup> And generally such constants are used simply as a practical shorthand device, because for the specific region in question the relevant data are not available at the time. The fact that a reasonable approximation can be achieved in this way is not, however, taken as an excuse for failing to improve the basic data. On the contrary, the pressure for such improvement has increased, especially since the Second World War. With the help of the technical offices of the United Nations, the area of reasonably reliable and comprehensive population data has been extended through Latin-America and into Africa.<sup>15</sup> There is every reason to assume that other countries will follow, and that with this further extension the demand will also be for more detailed statistics, to enable more variables to be taken into account.

Where, to some extent, the older tradition has spilled over, is in speculation upon the probable long-term trends of fertility and mortality. Even here, it is more a question of the existence of possible regularities rather than a belief in the application of constants or universals, and the regularities involved may provide a useful basis for detailed analysis. The main example here is the widely-used model of demographic development from a stage in which there is an uneasy equilibrium of high fertility and high mortality, through transitional periods in which first mortality and then fertility falls, reaching a new and easier equilibrium of low mortality and low fertility.<sup>16</sup> A model of this kind may be of considerable help when comparative studies are undertaken. Nevertheless, like the older and far more dogmatic belief in universals, it has its dangers. It tends to draw attention

away from deviant cases—from the case of France, for example, where fertility probably began to fall before mortality;<sup>17</sup> of Ireland, where marital fertility scarcely fell at all before the First World War, and where population control was exercised through the amount of marriage and through emigration;<sup>18</sup> of the Netherlands, where an extremely low mortality is found along with a high fertility;<sup>19</sup> and even of small communities, like the Christian-communist colonies of the Hutterites in the United States and Canada, still in some senses isolated from the host society in which they are set, and still practising the principle of 'be fruitful and multiply'—to the extent of maintaining an average of some ten live births per married woman of completed fertility.<sup>20</sup> There are, of course, studies of all these deviants, and of others, besides. But they are too often regarded as oddities, departures from the historical general rule, instead of being dealt with as highly specific case studies which might throw much light on the general rule itself.

I shall have to take up again later this question of traditional outlook and its bearing upon current demographic studies. For the moment, however, I want to return to the past and to amplify the statement that the outstanding characteristic of nineteenth-century demography was the systematic building up of details from regular national records.

The organization of periodic censuses was one component in this development. In England, once the General Register Office was established in 1837, those censuses had a permanent home, and it became easier to profit from experience and to extend both the scope and the analysis of the materials collected. Technical aids were also of great value here—the use of mechanical tabulation from 1911 onwards and the application of sampling techniques in connection with the 1951 census are examples. The other component in the development was the creation and gradual improvement of compulsory civil registration of births, marriages and deaths. It was in connection with civil registration, which began in 1837, that the General Register Office was set up—an Office first recommended by Lord Treasurer Burghley, in 1590.<sup>21</sup> And it was the collaboration between a wise Registrar General, George Graham, and a great vital statistician, William Farr, together with the receptiveness of a reorganized medical profession, that transformed our knowledge of one very important branch of demography in this country and had a considerable influence upon the development of the subject elsewhere.

Farr was perhaps not a wise man—certainly he was not worldly wise, to judge from his public rebuke of the only too well-known Robert Lowe, about whom he wrote: 'No one can express a proposition more clearly than Mr. Lowe: but the clearness of a proposition is no evidence of its truth'.<sup>22</sup> Nor was Farr a powerful innovator on the side of theoretical analysis, though some of his contributions stimulated later workers to take new steps in theory. But, like Graunt, he was outstanding because he applied an instructed imagination to the empirical material. And, unlike Graunt, he was able to do much to improve that material, and especially the data relating to mortality.

The change from parochial to civil registration in Britain was not motivated



solely by the Government's desire to know more about the facts of life and death. Most of the witnesses who gave evidence to the 1833 Select Committee on Parochial Registration—whose recommendations were responsible for the change—were concerned with the difficulties which arose, in the system of parish registration, in proving descent—difficulties connected with inheritance and the transfer of property. But there were witnesses who gave evidence on the demographic value of civil registration—Adolphe Quetelet, the great Belgian statistician, was one of them—and the committee stressed this need in its report. Curiously enough, one of the demographic witnesses, John Finlaison, actuary of the National Debt Office, while sharing the general views of Quetelet, doubted whether civil registration would throw light on the causes of death. 'As to anything like an account of the disease by which death is occasioned', he said, 'I should think that branch of inquiry is out of the question'.<sup>23</sup> Yet the 1833 meeting of the Provincial Medical and Surgical Association had specifically urged that the causes of death be recorded in the local registers of mortality,<sup>24</sup> and the development of cause mortality analysis was one of the most important contributions of the General Register Office. The *First Annual Report of the Registrar-General*, published in 1839, contains two documents which give the background of this development—a letter signed by the Presidents of the College of Physicians and of the College of Surgeons, as well as by the Master of the Society of Apothecaries, in effect assuring the co-operation of medical practitioners and undertaking 'to give, in every instance which may fall under our care, an authentic name of the fatal disease';<sup>25</sup> and a letter from Farr, outlining the basis of an improved classification of the causes of death—or, as he termed it in the then current usage, of a 'statistical nosology'.<sup>26</sup> The work thus foreshadowed ultimately enabled the General Register Office to answer one of the questions which, in his *Natural and Political Observations*, published in 1662, Graunt had urged as pertinent—'What proportion die of each general and perticular *Casualties*?'<sup>27</sup> And from this work, too, sprang eventually modern international action to provide comparable and meaningful classifications of the causes of death for all countries with vital statistics systems.

In ending his letter in this *First Annual Report*, Farr apologized because he had not, in 'a first essay', 'been able to examine the influence of age, occupation, seasons of the year, and other circumstances, upon the fatality of diseases. . . .'<sup>28</sup> Occupational mortality analysis, one of the questions to which he referred, was another of the major contributions of the General Register Office, though unfortunately with less influence upon developments in other countries. The nature of the contribution may be illustrated by taking one occupation, that of potters or earthenware makers, and looking at the informed comments upon that occupation at three different points of time.

Ramazzini, author of the classic eighteenth-century text on *Diseases of Workers*, knew of the hazards involved in this occupation. But he had no way of estimating the risks and he accepted the social and economic situation as he found it. Potters, he said, 'suffer from yet another drawback, I mean that they are poor, so that we must resort to the medicine of the poor and prescribe remedies that



will at least mitigate the disease; but first of all they must be warned to give up their trade'.<sup>29</sup> Thackrah, the English physician, who shortly before the beginning of civil registration published a study of the influence of occupations and 'civic states' on disease and mortality, attempted to collect statistical evidence and, together with his pupils, 'conversed on the subject with masters, overlookers, and the more intelligent workmen, and obtained many tables illustrating the character of the disorders prevalent in the several kinds of employ'.<sup>30</sup> But the statistics are extremely scanty, though he goes well beyond Ramazzini in his conclusions. He said:

I am told, by an intelligent manufacturer of earthenware in Leeds, that the comparative cheapness of the lead in glaze is the chief recommendation. Surely humanity forbids that the health of workmen, and that of the poor at large, should be sacrificed to the saving of half-pence in the price of pots.<sup>31</sup>

But Farr, in the famous *Supplement to the Thirty-Fifth Annual Report of the Registrar-General*,<sup>32</sup> published in 1875, gave the specific risks of workers engaged in the manufacture of earthenware. Taking men of 45 to 54 years of age, the death rate was 33.7 per thousand men—the highest of all the occupational rates listed. For miners the comparable risk of death was 20.5 per 1,000, for farmers 12.5 per 1,000, and for Protestant ministers 9.3 per 1,000. It was the calculation of specific risks of this kind which provided the argument for the regulations developed in connection with the use of lead oxide glaze in pottery manufacture.

No doubt Farr's statistics were very imperfect. But they represented a major change in approach, and both the basic data and their use could be and were improved. Part of the improvement came from the more consistent and sophisticated classification of occupations, enabling the particularly dangerous processes of generally hazardous occupations to be examined—such as cutlery grinding, to give one specific example.<sup>33</sup> At least as important an improvement was the combination of occupations into groups which were meaningful in terms of general economic and social circumstances—the contribution of Stevenson in 1911, marking the beginning of systematic 'social class' analysis of mortality differences.<sup>34</sup> Further insight into the rôle of general economic and social conditions as distinct from occupational hazards was provided by analyzing the mortality of infants by the occupational groups of their fathers and later—in 1931—the mortality of married women by the occupational groups of their husbands. These analyses showed consistent patterns, with the highest death rates in the poorest groups and the results underlined the need for general social and economic policy as well as for specific measures of industrial protection.

In talking about the way in which the study of death rates and of the causes of death has been made more systematic and more comprehensive during the past century, I have given only the most sketchy indication of what has happened. But accepting the fact that I have left out many important changes, I do not think that I have seriously distorted the main outlines of development. That is because of the nature of the subject. For one thing, development has been pretty consistent, carried out largely by official statisticians who because, of public concern to reduce mortality, were able to improve and extend

their basic data, so that in a considerable measure they had the statistics they wanted to have. And though there were—and still are—marked variations between countries in the collection and use of mortality statistics, there has been much consultation between official statisticians of the different countries, especially on the meaningful classification of the causes of death, and fair agreement on what ought to be done, even if it is not always actually done. Hence, illustrating the change over time from the history of one country, and especially from Britain, gives a reasonable idea of general developments. Further, though there are many technical and practical problems involved in the subject, the concepts applied in analyzing mortality are fairly simple. The general idea of a life table, for example, is certainly not difficult to understand. It is easy to see that, if we know the chances of dying at each year of age, then taking, say, 1,000 new-born babies, we can calculate how many will survive to the fifth birthday, how many to their tenth, and so on. Moreover, this concept was known, elaborated and accepted well before the establishment of regular population and vital statistics in most countries. Hence there were concepts and, to a considerable extent, techniques, developed upon the basis of relatively poor statistics and, so to speak, 'lying in wait' for the more comprehensive and satisfactory official data which were later collected.

The history of fertility analysis has been less consistent and less simple. There was nothing corresponding to the detail of even the defective Bills of Mortality to provide a basis for the early analysis of fertility. The London Bills of Mortality, for example, gave causes of death—even though those causes were attributed by lay 'searchers', described by Graunt as 'antient Matrons, sworn to their Office'—and in the eighteenth century they gave ages at death. But on the fertility side it was only the numbers of baptisms and marriages that were available. Hence Graunt and many later writers attempted to measure fertility by dividing the baptisms by the marriages. That is how Graunt, for example, concluded that 'every *Wedding*, one with another, produces four Children, and consequently, that that is the proportion of Children, which any Marriagable man, or woman may be presumed shall have'.<sup>35</sup> When a total population was known or estimated, a birth ratio or birth rate might be calculated. Thus Gregory King, with his estimates of population and births in London, computed that 'in 1,000 co-existing persons, there are 9.4 marriages in London, producing 37.6 children'.<sup>36</sup> Relatively little advance on this approach was made during the ensuing hundred years, for on the side of fertility there was nothing corresponding to the practical concern with life insurance or annuities or tontines to provoke an interest in developing the subject. Even in European States with mercantilist population policies, there was far more interest in encouraging marriage and the raising of families than in ascertaining the effects of such encouragement. Hence, when the new systems of population and vital statistics were created, there were no well-tried and validated techniques of analysis waiting to be applied. It was the rather crude, early measures which were used. Farr himself, for example, used crude birth rates and ratios of births to marriages, and made little contribution to the development of more meaningful indices.

Just because public concern in the nineteenth century was focused primarily—and rightly—upon the reduction of mortality, there was much less incentive to probe more deeply into fertility studies or to collect more detailed official statistics relating to births, and here civil registration often did little more than follow along the lines laid down by the earlier parish registration. Some countries did provide greater detail. In Sweden, for example, from 1775 onwards the birth records showed the ages at which mothers bore their children. And in Scotland, where compulsory civil registration began in 1855, the new system opened with a bang, the birth records providing information on the age of the mother, the date of her marriage and the number of children she had borne previously. But those details were abandoned after the first year.<sup>37</sup> In England, Farr recognized the importance of this more detailed information, but he was unable to have it collected.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, it was not until the 1930s that public interest, aroused by the persistent fall in the birth rate, made possible a complete revision of our birth statistics. There were, it is true, other sources of information on fertility movements and patterns. At the 1911 censuses in Great Britain for example, married women were asked how many live births they had had during their current marriage, and the analysis of the information collected—especially that for England and Wales—was of outstanding interest.<sup>39</sup> But it was not until public opinion had been sufficiently stimulated by discussion of the continuous fall in the birth rate, that the experiment was repeated here—in the form of a sample family census, taken in 1946 for the Royal Commission on Population.<sup>40</sup> I might add that the 1911 census made it possible for the first time in Britain to answer the questions which Gregory King, writing in the 1690s, had considered most pertinent in studying fertility—that is, how many marriages are childless, and how many have one, two, three or other numbers of children. But later demographers could scarcely have taken heed of King's suggestions for, contained in one of his notebooks, they have still to be published.<sup>41</sup>

It was not until quite late in the nineteenth century that new ideas for studying and measuring fertility began to emerge. I do not think that I shall be grossly inaccurate if I say that what then happened was the development of two distinct approaches. First, in looking at questions of fertility differences between such groups as 'social classes', what might be called a 'natural' approach was used. That is, such differences were often measured by comparing the average number of children borne by a married woman in one 'social class' with the average borne by a married woman in another. This was the kind of comparison in which eugenists and sociologists were particularly interested. The other approach was in connection with the study of what is now generally called 'replacement'. Though the idea is essentially simple—especially now that we are all accustomed to it—it required a brilliant leap of the imagination to see, as did Böckh and Kuczynski in Germany, that in examining the long-run tendency of a population to grow or decline, crude birth and death rates were useless and so, too, were customary refinements of those rates. What was needed was to estimate how many children a woman was likely to have, and how many of these children were likely to survive to adulthood.<sup>42</sup> And it took at least an equal leap of the imagination

to do what Lotka did in the United States—to work out independently the mathematics which proved that if the chances of having children and of those children surviving were to remain fixed, the population would eventually grow or decline at a fixed rate, and would have a fixed proportion of males and females and of individuals of various ages.<sup>13</sup>

This 'replacement' approach was in essence as 'natural' as the approach used in studying fertility differences between groups. After all, it is certainly 'natural' to think of the number of children a woman is likely to have and of the proportion of those children likely to survive into adulthood. The way in which the idea was applied in practice, however, was rather 'unnatural'. The number of children a woman was likely to have over the whole of her childbearing period was calculated by adding together her separate chances of having a child in each year of her life—in her fifteenth year of age, in her sixteenth, seventeenth, and so on, up to her fiftieth. That again is perfectly sensible. But in the actual calculations, it was not the successive chances of the same woman or the same group of women that were added, but those of different generations. The analysis was not focused upon a group of women moving together up the age ladder or through married life, but upon a particular calendar year in which births were taking place. Thus the calculations put together in one index the chances of a woman born 19 years ago having a baby in her twentieth year of age, and the chances of a different woman born 49 years ago having a baby in her fiftieth year. And that is unrealistic, because it implicitly assumes that the successive years of married life are separate and independent units. There were other difficulties with the index, too. Thus, although it was designed to measure the inherent or long-run tendency of a population to grow or decline, the index was in fact affected by short-run variations. For example, births may be postponed when there is unemployment and made up again with later prosperity, so that total family size may not be affected. Nevertheless, during the period of postponement and making-up, the index would show considerable year-to-year fluctuations, giving an inaccurate picture of the trend of family size. The full story of the shortcomings of the index is long and complicated. But to bring that story to an end I shall just say that while the idea of measuring replacement has steadily increased in importance, the way in which it is measured has changed very greatly during the past 15 years. We now have indices which are less precise but which are far more realistic and meaningful. Moreover, the new methods, tracing the experience of a group of women through the childbearing period, have brought about a much greater unity of approach to the study of fertility, breaking across the division which I mentioned earlier.

My reason for discussing in some detail this question of the measurement of replacement—a technical question, perhaps rather out of place in a general lecture—is that it illustrates two points about the development of demography. First, it again shows the influence of tradition in the early stages and then of adaptation in response to experience in using the data and to changes in the population situation. A recent article has suggested—though only as a partial explanation—that in pre-war days demographers focused their analysis on the



calendar years in which births occurred rather than on generations of women, because of a desire to be as up to date as possible in their calculations.<sup>44</sup> That may be so: demographers, like other mortals, no doubt often feel time pressing on their heels. But that is, I am sure, far from the whole story. In the early stages, when the life table was the most developed technique of analysis in demography, it would have been almost inevitable to take that table as the starting point in the construction of a replacement index, rather than to ask in the first place how fertility might best be measured and then to adapt the life table to fit the fertility index. Moreover, life tables themselves were usually calculated on the deaths occurring in given calendar years; they rarely traced the mortality of a generation of persons.<sup>45</sup> Given this background, habit or laziness of mind—a fault not confined to demographers—would then act to maintain the particular type of approach. It was only when the demographic position itself had changed, when public interest had been aroused by the decline of fertility, and when, in addition, the replacement index was itself fluctuating from year to year, that the whole approach to the study of fertility was reviewed. This occurred in Sweden, for example, when two Royal Commissions had been set up to study the population question; and in France after the establishment of a government-financed demographic research institute. In Britain, too, it was a Royal Commission which had a similar effect—provoking a fresh study of the extent to which family size had fallen. Indeed, many of the new developments in the measurement of replacement are the results of the work of John Hajnal, who was research assistant to the Commission, and of W. A. B. Hopkin, their Assistant Secretary.<sup>46</sup> I notice, too, in looking at its Report again, that the Statistics Committee of the British Royal Commission had 62 full meetings and many sub-committee meetings. I doubt if the members of that Committee had ever before had the opportunity to discuss fertility analysis at such length!

The second point is that the new approach of following generations has spilled over into, or been paralleled in, other branches of demography and related studies. Generations of children are being followed up in connection with the study of intelligence and achievement.<sup>47</sup> Babies born in a specified week are being traced through childhood, and information collected on morbidity, on behaviour problems, and on school performance.<sup>48</sup> A comparable approach is being used in examining divorce trends. I do not suggest that concern with the declining birth rate gave rise to all this. But it is clear that an approach which sees experience as a continuous process, not as a series of separate bites out of life, can appropriately be applied to a wide range of questions, and is 'shocking' demographic study out of its traditional channels.

That is all to the good, for we have reached a point at which traditional approaches, even if highly successful in the past, now require to be complemented by a rather different kind of examination of rather different factors from those customarily looked at. This almost goes without saying so far as the study of fertility is concerned. There, even taking the newer work into account, we have not moved very far beyond the stage of measuring and identifying. Thus we believe that in Britain family size has stabilized and is pretty near to the replacement



level, even though large families have been almost eliminated. We have also found that differences in family size between the social classes have not changed much during the past generation and that the existing differences can be very largely accounted for in terms of birth control practice.<sup>49</sup> But we know very little about motivation, or about the pressures by which people are affected, and we shall certainly not learn much about them unless we go beyond the factors which it has been customary to examine up to the present.<sup>50</sup> In the study of mortality, too, where there is a long record of effective inquiry, the need to move beyond the traditional limits is evident. This is particularly so as regards social class differences in mortality, and the problem here is sharply defined by the results of recent studies of infant mortality.

During the past fifty years, much effort and much expenditure have been put into services designed to reduce infant mortality. And certainly infant mortality has fallen very greatly indeed. In that part of the nineteenth century for which we have reasonably good records, the rate in England and Wales scarcely moved away from 150 deaths per 1,000 live births; by 1950 the rate was only thirty deaths per 1,000 live births. Theoretically, the public services built up during the present century should have had the greatest effect upon the poorest groups, for whom otherwise there would have been far less access to medical advice and treatment. Yet the record shows about the same proportionate fall in infant mortality in each social class, so that in 1950, with a totally different overall level, the relative positions were nevertheless nearly those of 1911. In the poorest class in 1950, infant mortality was still more than twice as high as in the top class.<sup>51</sup>

One suggested explanation of this lack of relative change relates to factors associated with social mobility. As there is substantial movement up and down the social scale in Britain, and as that movement is selective in terms of physical and intellectual qualities, it is said that a 'balancing-out' process may be taking place, keeping the social classes parallel to each other and still different in terms of qualities which may have a significant effect upon infant mortality.<sup>52</sup> But though such a 'balancing-out' might conceivably take place between large groups like social classes, it seems unlikely that they would apply so neatly to specific occupations. And the studies of J. N. Morris and his colleagues, undertaken in collaboration with the General Register Office, have shown that even if we consider specific occupations from different levels in the community, the same kinds of differences in infant mortality persist. And this has also been the case of different areas in the country, whether urban or rural.<sup>53</sup> Another possibility mentioned is that of differences in maternal capacity or efficiency. That, too, is conceivable, but maternal efficiency cannot be applied in a vacuum; it has to have a set of practical possibilities within which to operate. Thus a recent investigation of the health and growth of young children suggests that it is when there are good housing conditions that differences in maternal efficiency are important. But when housing is poor, lacking bathrooms and running hot water, even the efficient mother struggles in vain.<sup>54</sup>

Questions of this kind cannot be settled by argument; they require specific

investigations, many of which could be carried out only through the General Register Office, for they would involve substantial additions to the information collected by the census and at the registration of births and deaths. But there is no less need for other inquiries, which could be undertaken on a much smaller scale. I have in mind, for example, studies of the specific accessibility to and use of medical advice by different sections of the community, of the importance of education in this respect, of the part played by the husband in the care given to infants, to list a few possibilities. Inquiries such as these would have to be directly complementary to the more extensive investigations if they were to yield the maximum value, and they would certainly mean a substantial change in the boundaries of formal demography and a closer relationship between demographers and other social scientists. That is inevitable, and it is also highly desirable. We have come to learn a good deal about the facts of life and death since the days of John Graunt. We undoubtedly need to know still more about them. But we also need a better understanding of the 'how' and 'why' of events and it is there that a major change in demographic studies is now required.

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## QUESTIONS

MR. A. M. FARRAG: There has been a great deal of controversy as regards the effects of the declining birthrate on the quantity and quality of the human race. Some people say that it is a good thing to have a declining birthrate in order to maintain a good level of economic status. Others say that if the decline in population rise is always due to the decline of the birthrate among the more highly educated, then we are bound to get poor quality in the human race eventually. What does Professor Glass think of that argument?

THE LECTURER: It is possible, but not so far demonstrated. We did a very large-scale repeat inquiry among children in Scotland, to test the belief that because of the decline in birthrate among the middle classes and because the more intelligent families have smaller numbers of children, the intelligence of the nation was likely to decline. One psychologist argued that the decline would be at the rate of two or three points of I.Q. per generation. But the inquiry done in Scotland showed no decline whatever in the I.Q. So far, in spite of the fact that there is still a negative correlation, there is still this apparent tendency for the more intelligent children to be born in small families, and for the children of large families to be less intelligent.

I myself am sceptical regarding the hypothesis. Differential fertility has existed in many societies in the past, but it would be extremely difficult to prove that we are less intelligent than our forebears.

MR. JOHN CRISFORD: In England, if a child is born on 6th April, a whole year's income tax relief can be claimed. Does the double impact of taxation and birth control have any measurable effect on the birth figures of this country, and does it do so in other countries?

THE LECTURER: Taxation certainly seems to effect the seasonal distribution of marriages. I know quite a number of cases of people who leave their marriage until the last possible date for income tax purposes, but no one yet has been so able to plan a birth as to make absolutely sure that it occurs on 5th April. There are seasonal and cyclical variations in other societies. In agricultural societies, of course, variations often follow the harvest season. They also follow changes in prices. In eighteenth-century Sweden the Royal Swedish Academy wrote a report on the influence of good and bad harvests on marriage and fertility. They said that if there were a good harvest, prices of food went down and every young person thought of getting married. Moreover, they added, even among those married, the flame of love would burn more brightly than it did before. There are many examples of that kind of variation. But in the industrialized societies variations in births during the year tend to flatten out, though variations in respect of the trade cycle are still important.

MR. K. H. KHALIK: Could Professor Glass tell us if it is possible to say that any one race is more efficient in fertility than another?

THE LECTURER: I do not know how you would define 'more efficient'. In one sense the most efficient group in that connection is that community of Hutterites. They have ten live births to every married woman and a very large proportion of those children survive. They have the mortality of the United States and a fertility higher than that of an under-developed country. But how would you define efficiency?

MR. MAULUD AHMAD KHAN: The lecturer mentioned that at one time polygamy was considered against nature, on the basis that the number of women and men at that time happened to be equal; but what does the lecturer think of the time when the number of the women happened to be greater than the men? I would suggest that the very idea of thinking of women in terms of commodities, and deciding their distribution on that principle, seems unnatural.

THE LECTURER: I was not presenting my own point of view. I was merely quoting the theological demographers of the seventeenth century. It was not my intention to express an ethical judgment on polygamy *versus* monogamy. I may say that the speaker is certainly right in one sense that changes in circumstances change attitudes towards polygamy. It is even reported—though I do not know whether it is true—that on occasions, in mediaeval Europe, attacks of plague in particular cities so reduced the population that priests were encouraged to marry and polygamy was regarded with some favour.

MR. COLIN JOHN BELLIS: The lecturer gave two reasons for the differential infant mortality, namely selective processes and maternal capacity. I have heard one further reason suggested on which I would like his opinion: that during the 1930s there was a high incidence of rickets amongst working-class families and that this would now influence the differential in infant mortality rate, because the children of the 1930s would become parents in the 1950s.

THE LECTURER: It is true that this is the kind of work that Professor Baird and his team have been looking at in Aberdeen. But the evidence does not seem to me to be convincing.

*A vote of thanks to the Lecturer was carried with acclamation, and the meeting then ended.*

### III. CHANGES IN SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES— AND THE MISFIT

by

ROGER F. TREDGOLD, M.A., M.D.,

*delivered to the Society at 6 p.m. on Monday,  
28th May, 1956, with A. R. N. Roberts, a Member  
of Council of the Society, in the Chair*

THE CHAIRMAN: This is the third and last of one of the series of lectures which the Society holds annually, thanks to a handsome bequest from Dr. William Cantor. I do not know whether Dr. Cantor suffered a great deal at the hands of chairmen, as well he may have done; the utterances of some chairmen are like the earth at the creation 'without form and void'. But however that may be, it has been the custom for Cantor Lectures to be delivered by an authority on his subject who has been deemed superior to the need for a chairman or the ordeal of a discussion after his address. I hope you will not infer from the fact that I am in the chair to-night that Dr. Tredgold's distinction in his own field is below the standard customary in Cantor Lectures, because if you did infer that you would be wrong. He is a practitioner and exponent of psychology, he is a man of wisdom and wit who, to my knowledge is regarded with respect and affection in medical, educational and industrial circles.

I have been asked to preside for two reasons which I will very briefly explain. I am the Chairman of the Society's Special Activities Committee which recommends to this Society lines of action in matters of public interest which it can usefully take. Some months ago the Committee received a request, or rather a statement, from one of the Fellows of the Society, that in these days of universal suffrage an unenlightened democracy was a greater danger than the atomic bomb. The Committee recalled that the Society had recently set up a syllabus in civics, that is to say in the nature of government, and its national and local machinery, and we therefore felt that we might best meet this eloquent correspondent's request by arranging for a series of lectures based on those sciences which may have recently illuminated and enlarged the field of sociology. This series will, we hope, lead to further private study of the urges and the stresses of contemporary society. Economics has sometimes been referred to as the dismal science because it has tended to be a study of scarcity rather than abundance and sociology, because it has often dealt with sections of the population to the exclusion of an understanding of the individual, has tended surprisingly to be the impersonal science.

In my younger days, for instance, there was a horrible phrase current—'the submerged tenth'. Contrast that expression with Dr. Tredgold's title to-night, 'Changes in Social Responsibilities—and the Misfit'. It is because the Royal Society of Arts feels strongly that we must all seek a truer understanding, not only of social trends, but of the problem of the maladjusted individual that we have asked Dr. Tredgold to lecture to us. Since we have chosen a specialist to deliver this lecture we do not wish a discussion to follow which will controvert his main recommendations, but we shall welcome questions to elucidate and amplify them. We hope, indeed, that these questions will arise in such numbers that a chairman will be needed to control them. That is the second reason why I have the honour to take the chair for Dr. Tredgold whose lecture, from past experience I am confident, will inform, delight and stimulate us all.

*The following lecture was then delivered:*



## THE LECTURE

I am very sensible of the honour done me by the Society, in asking me to give the third of this series of lectures, which is clearly designed to be of a very challenging nature, and I must express my gratitude and appreciation.

I must admit that I am somewhat appalled at the prospect of having to follow the last two speakers; for not only are they eminent in their own right, but also they have chosen, or had chosen for them, subjects which can be presented in a scientific manner, appropriate to this audience; which I fear is more than I can do with mine. Change is always difficult to measure; so is responsibility; and the misfit—is a misfit. I must therefore ask you to bear with me if I deal more with theories and opinions and trends than with facts and figures. What I have to say must be largely immeasurable, which is, alas, by no means the same thing as being invaluable.

## CURRENT OPINIONS

The subject under consideration in this lecture is that of changes in social responsibilities, with special reference to the misfit. Now these two terms may already have called to your mind (but I have no skill in telepathy) a thought which I believe to be very commonly expressed these days—that there is less sense of social responsibility, and there are more misfits than there used to be or than there should be. No doubt this thought is often expressed under some camouflage, but none the less it is recognizable. I should like at the start to spend a few moments considering why such a thought should be prevalent.

The first reason may be, of course, that it is true and we, must return to that; but the first reason for many opinions is not that they are true, but that they do their possessor some good—sometimes short term, sometimes long. We can scarcely fail to notice here that the people who do hold this opinion do seem to get considerable satisfaction out of doing so, and more out of stating it. With their statement, there is nearly always an aura of smugness, a halo of self-complacency and the implication is inescapable that the speaker feels himself to be a most admirably responsible citizen; he may add to his comments by advice of a high moral, but low practical, value. Presumably then this opinion is useful to him in flattering his pride.

But at times there is another reason than pride; for the smugness is streaked with anger—naturally 'righteous indignation' to its possessor. And this attitude of mixed anger and self-complacency is not uncommon in our society; some have coined a name for it—the 'holier-than-thou' attitude. It is interesting to reflect on this.

We see many individuals nowadays who are upright, certainly law-abiding and generally tolerant; but they are curiously sensitive to the infringements of the law by others, and their reaction is out of all proportion to the offence. We may notice the wave of hostility which goes up from a previously docile, or apathetic bus queue, when a late-comer attempts to jump the queue. It is almost as if the others would have liked to do the same, but had not had the courage or the

imagination to do so. It is possible then that those who decry the increasing social irresponsibility of the community have one of these two unconscious, or partly conscious, motives for doing so. This would be more likely if it could be shown that for all of us, the developments of a social conscience is reached with some conflict and some pain, and by no means always pleasantly or willingly.

There may be another reason, too, behind it: the tendency of all races and men, as far as we know, to praise the past at the expense of the present. This is, of course summed up once for all in the old saying 'things are not what they used to be; they never were'. I do not entirely believe the story of some such remark having been found incised in cuneiform on one of the oldest Babylonian bricks ever dug up; but I suspect that it has been said for centuries.

You will remember the aged king Nestor, of Sandy Pylos, in the *Odyssey*, who was asked by the agitated Telemachus for news of Odysseus and was quite unable to refrain from lamenting the grandeur of old times. How much this was due to physical causes, anæmia or avitaminosis, which impaired his concentration on recent events, and so make the past seem more vivid, we do not know. On the other hand, it must be admitted that Solomon, a younger contemporary of Nestor's it may be, but clearly in greater touch with human relations (for he was polygamous), remarked that there was no new thing under the sun, and that all was vanity.

These then are some causes for the prevalence of our habits of criticising the present; they give pleasure. But these habits are also important in that their effect on the listener is exactly the opposite; to him they are not pleasant at all, but irritating, if not infuriating. They will be accepted very seldom, and acted on less. This reaction is beautifully described by Sir Harold Nicolson in *Good Behaviour*; it was the early Christians' 'attitude towards the non-elect that irritated people, not their faith. There was . . . their exclusiveness . . . they adopted a sanctimonious manner, a self-satisfied expression and indicated in their gait the superiority of their morals'. The result will be persecution if possible, a hardening of heart into sullen obstinacy and resentment if not. We can see for example, that the best way to make a coal strike persist is for the newspapers to lecture the miners on patriotism, or their lack of it.

But these reasons do not mean that the view is untrue, any more than that it is true. Can we say that social responsibility is increasing, or is lessening? There are no direct statistics, and no yardstick. But if we read the social historian, we shall note that changes are recorded. In some ways there is a greater respect for the life of others, as seen by the abolition of slavery, and of the death penalty—for stealing; on the other hand, perhaps the conscience even of the mediæval town-sacker would have been shocked by the possibilities of destruction now upon us in the shape of the hydrogen bomb. So there are changes either way.

I think the only lesson is that a sense of social responsibility is there to be drawn out of most of us, if some focus can be found for it—and this focus', existence and nature depends on those who educate us. A similar conclusion was apparently held by a soldier to whom I was talking a few days ago: 'national servicemen are all right', he said, 'if we give them the right things to do'. Marshal

Suvorov's comment was the same: 'soldiers like being trained—if they see any sense in it'.

#### INDICATIONS OF CHANGING RESPONSIBILITY

But there are indications of certain changes in social responsibility, which we can observe, and which have some reflection in statistical reports. There is, for example, the attitude of many citizens to their relatives who suffer from either amentia or dementia—in other words, from mental deficiency or senile decay. The evidence is that an increasing number of each type of case is needing institutional care.

Now this, of course, may be due to other factors than a decline in social responsibility. Logically, there might be an absolute increase in both types; or there might be a greater difficulty in looking after them, not a greater dislike of doing so. I believe, in fact, that all these are true, at least with regard to dementia. There are more old people, relatively (and so a greater chance for each one of us to become demented) because the triumphs of general medicine have increased an expectation of life. (Unfortunately, we do not live more fully or abundantly; and indeed some, whose bodies have been saved from decay, while their brains have not, are perhaps, in T. S. Eliot's phrase, living and partly living.) But I do not think that this is enough to account for the throngs in our mental hospitals; nor do I think that the housing difficulties, acute as I know they are, are enough in themselves. In any case, these factors are also bringing about or increasing this very change in attitude that we are discussing. As to defectives, the evidence of increasing incidence is doubtful; it seems certain that there is no increase adequate to cause the steady rise in the waiting lists. But I agree that the housing shortage and other domestic responsibilities are also factors.

Yet, those who have to deal with relatives of such people are aware that more are displaying the attitude that the State should be responsible for all the disabled as a matter of course. It is not easy to say how much this stems from the attitude of mind which greeted the introduction of the Health Service—which was unfortunately one of 'rights' and 'privileges', and not one of corresponding responsibilities. I am, of course, speaking here of my own impressions, and not giving statistics, and there must be very many and very honourable exceptions.

These attitudes are moderately familiar to me from my work; there are others in other walks of life. One hears, but it may be mere rumour, of business men charging lunches at £6 a head up to their expenses account; if so, it can hardly benefit the community; and it may even destroy the morale of their non-lunching colleagues even more quickly than the lining of their own stomachs. In the Civil Service, too, there may be irresponsibility; many of you will have read that brilliant article on Parkinson's Law, in *The Economist*—how staffs inevitably increase from status, not from extra work.

No doubt some such behaviour has always occurred, and always will; the differences now are two: that it meets less public censure, more condonation ('of course, No. 1 comes first—why not?'); and secondly, that it seems more prevalent. There are no figures, but there does seem to me a tendency this way. It is true certainly, that such people present a social problem, and are a stress

to a state of nicely balanced economy, so that even the slightest increase causes legitimate concern.

You must then allow me to theorize, and even to make recommendations for action from my theories—of course, on an experimental basis; for after all doctors have frequently to do just this, in their patients' interests. We cannot always wait, in medicine, for the final diagnosis to be made, before we consider some line of treatment; for some diagnoses are not made until *post-mortem*. Our behaviour then is naturally more satisfying to the patient, though I realize very well it must appear maddeningly unscientific and therefore most infuriating to the true scientist (until he is ill himself). So we may indulge in a little speculation. 'It is not a gamble for we can lose nothing', as Mr. Macmillan says.

#### CAUSATION OF SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY

We may ask ourselves how such irresponsibility arises, and when. There are, of course, several possibilities; popular opinion, as we have seen, has long held that it is an attitude that develops in childhood; but this comment is only precise in that the children are always someone else's. Recent work on child development has provided more detail, and suggests that the formation of the child's relationships with others begins in his second year, and depends, amongst other things, on an adequate supply of affection from the parent, or some substitute, beforehand. Those who fail are unlikely to be capable of any social responsibility later. When grown-up (that is physically grown-up), they will appear in various guises—to the psychiatrist they will be anti-social psychopaths; to the soldier, barrack-room lawyers, or sometimes mutineers; to the magistrate and police, criminals; to the industrialist, trouble-makers, sometimes 'communists', though they would not be communists in Russia, or anywhere else that Communism was in power. They are indeed the opposite of the time-server, for they must always swim against the stream. In Elton Mayo's term, they are 'destroyers'. Finally, to their parents, they are an abiding disgrace,—and some sense of guilt and failure may seep through, to increase the parents' exasperation and despair. No doubt, in past ages, they were often to be found at the bottom of some of the world's trouble-spots; and they have on occasion been played on by circumstances, or by the unscrupulous, to swell the ranks of the Great Assassins of history.

Apart from such dubious usefulness, they have been an unmitigated nuisance to their fellows, and to the authorities listed above they have seemed incurable. Only the psychiatrist sees any hope, and he not much; for the analytic treatment required to go back to the failures of childhood, and establish new attitudes, depends for its success on time, patience, skill and co-operation which, for practical reasons, are seldom forthcoming; few cures are recorded.

#### RESPONSIVE PEOPLE

But these psychopaths are the acute cases and do not form a large proportion of the community, though their importance may be out of all proportion to their number. Many other people show attitudes which are of the same kind



though they are far less severe, and are often transitory. It may be that they too have failed in relationship formation, but if so, their failure has been less complete and a more or less satisfactory adjustment to life has been made. These people are certainly capable of responding to other influences during their life, so that it is important to know what these influences are, and how, in particular, each can increase or decrease the social responsibility of the individual whom we may call 'responsive'.

We do not know the relative proportions of the psychopaths and of these other 'responsive' people, but the latter must be many more. Numerical estimates are not easy, and it may be that we can do no better than quote Plato, whose opinion was that ninety per cent of the population were neither good nor bad, but would behave in the way in which they were expected to behave; of the remainder, five were psychopaths, five perfect citizens. If so, we come back to the need to study the influence of the environment on us all.

The proposition is then that most of us are liable to behave in a socially responsible way, if we are aware that we are expected to do so. This expectation comes from a number of figures: parents, the rest of the family, teachers and schoolfellows, and later the various media of communication; art; literature; conversation; newspapers; films; radio and television. In this generation, the last four are, I think, predominant, if not entirely exclusive for the bulk of the population; and if one asks what topics in press, film or broadcast have the widest interest, the answer gives one cause to think very seriously. The power of such organs to produce opinions has, of course, been demonstrated by more than one totalitarian State; but we have thought less of the results which will still occur from such propaganda, even if it is entirely haphazard and not vicious. (In this connection it would seem fair to think that the insistence of the American film censorship, that evil must not in the end triumph, is at least a positive step—not a new one, of course, for all the other fairy tales have had the same rule, and anyhow, it is only a step up a very long staircase.)

But in our own memory there have been examples too of the opposite. We have seen the average citizen respond to appeals couched in terms he can understand, or more accurately to appeals calling on emotions of whose existence he has become unaware. His sense of social responsibility has been awakened and then satisfied. He has felt loyal and has been heroic. We need not despair. We must ask, how is he to be so moved?

#### THE TEACHING OF RESPONSIBILITY

In the first instance, surely, the expectation of parents, family and school, must be such that social responsibility is fostered, approved and later found enjoyable. At the start, it will seldom be pleasant, for it will seem, at any rate, to conflict with the interests of the individual. Some constraint may be imposed, and some outlet must be allowed for the aggression which results in the child. This is naturally directed to parents and teachers and, less perhaps, to siblings and schoolfellows. If it is to be successfully accepted, there must be a certain security on the part of the former (parents and teachers, that is); and some



framework, organized consciously or not; so that the aggression can be dealt with, without too great a threat to the unity of the family or school group; and here a group of moderate size has obvious advantages over a smaller.

If we consider next the groups with which we are familiar, and ask if such conditions apply, we shall be disturbed, for we shall see that here and there social changes are destroying those groups in which they can act, and substituting instead others where they can not do so, or at least do so less. Families are getting smaller, and in particular the families of those who have in the past shown more social responsibility. There is much break-up of family life, and it is by no means uncommon to meet a child who has (as my son put it simply), three fathers,—but no home. Schools, it is true, are increasing in extent and scope; but this does not apply to boarding schools, and the day-school has less chance of redressing the balance for a boy from a broken home, exposed as he is to its daily stress. Further, it seems common these days—again I have only an impression, and no statistics—to find many parents and teachers who are too insecure themselves to cope with the expressed or repressed aggression of their children. Most of us, when we stop to think, are quite prepared to admit the extreme value and difficulty of the task of both teachers and parents; yet the former are grossly overworked and underpaid, in my view; and as to parenthood, it is one of those things, alas, like being a good mixer, and being mentally perfect: we pride ourselves on it, but we can not bear to start to learn the essentials for fear of what we may find if we do. (Driving a car, and our pride in that, is not very different, except that here public opinion insists on a minimum standard, for the sake of public safety; any rise in the standard to increase the public safety would be most bitterly opposed. Bad parenthood is not so obvious in its dangers, for they are not so immediate.)

#### THE INSECURITY OF AUTHORITY

There are no doubt several reasons for the insecurity of both parent and teacher. Apart from broken homes, the physical conditions of many houses are still shocking; some schools are not good either, though it is probably quite unnecessary to insist, as authorities sometimes do, on a standard of comfort well above that of our older public schools. School classes are often far too large; but perhaps the most important force is that public opinion now no longer supports teacher and parent in their authority. He or she is undermined by the fear of being thought a tyrant; the rules of the past have been withdrawn and others have not yet been established. The sensitiveness of teachers on this point may be gauged by their remarkable example of irresponsible aggression, in refusing to collect savings, in the shock of a direct 'betrayal' by the minister (dare one say it—their 'father-figure'?) Clearly, too, it is little use increasing the time at school, unless the teachers are adequate in quality as well as quantity.

All this comes tragically at a time when teaching and parenthood need more skill, not less. We are in a phase of transition from an autocratic or aristocratic society, to one which is more democratic. In the course of the change, the pendulum has swung a little too far, and we have lost sight of responsibilities in

our proper desire for individual rights. ('No rights without proportionate responsibilities' would be a better slogan than many which have won elections, and wars in the past.) Consequently teachers have been discouraged from maintaining even that framework of discipline which is surely necessary for the control and safe release of the individual's aggressive reactions.

It is ironic that psychiatrists are often blamed for the loosening of discipline. Many have, of course, recommended freer expression and perhaps have over-emphasized this to counter the repression of the Victorians, but they have not to my knowledge suggested that this should be without any sort of consideration of others. To do so, with any herd animal, would surely be disastrous.

From these difficulties may arise some increase in the number of psychopaths though I doubt if this is significant—but more important is the tendency for the responsive to become more selfish and less responsible.

It is my contention, then, that social responsibility in this country—meaning the responsibility of each of us for the welfare of each other citizen, is getting less and that this is the result, directly or not, of several forces. In this I would list the break up of many families; the lessened skill and security of both parents and teachers; the lessened influence of the citizen who is responsible on him who is not, and conversely the greater influence of irresponsible and self-centring propaganda by press, wireless and other means, and so the lack of expectation of responsibility in the community; and finally there is the misuse of leisure—vitally important at a time when automation may give us more leisure before we have learnt to use it. Moreover, these conditions increase in their scope and power, and will do so faster as social irresponsibility increases. It is then a vicious spiral. The results are unpredictable in detail; but we may recall the popular mental outlook which existed at the time we refer to as 'the decline and fall of the Roman Empire'.

Are we aware of it? Few are wholly and fully. The majority are unaware and complacent; a minority has some vague sense of it, and is anxious and ill at ease. But this anxiety, tragically, leads to no appropriate action; indeed it does the reverse, for it may well lead, as we have seen, to criticism, anger and superiority. And this is unlikely to cause anything but stubborn ill-will, and a hardening into self-interest, self-righteousness, and perhaps a narrow loyalty to a small group.

#### THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

Finally, we may consider briefly the effect of this spiral elsewhere, on international relations. We are still islanders, but we are not isolated, nor can we afford to be insular. Certainly the days of imperialism are dead, but the common weal of the world as well as of the commonwealth deserves as much thought as the Empire did; and should be our greatest pre-occupation—until we reach Mars, Venus or the Moon (I speak in terms of astronomy, not astrology, or even lunacy).

There are few world citizens as yet, and the work of world organizations, such as the World Health Organization and the World Federation for Mental Health, is too little known. Instead national interests are consistently put first—

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There are few world citizens as yet, and the work of world organizations, such as the World Health Organization and the World Federation for Mental Health, is too little known. Instead national interests are consistently put first—



just as, within nations, the interests of small groups are preferred to the nation's. 'Charity begins at home' is literally true, and unobjectionable; but it is often used to mean 'charity stops at home' and in this sense 'charity' is quite incompatible with the 'charity' of the authorized version of St. Paul's epistle to the Corinthians.

The same forces, mostly reactions to insecurity, pride and ignorance, are at work and must be studied if we are to check the vicious spiral which is active in this field as well. Has there been an alternative? We can see certain examples from history.

In the past various civilizations, including our own, have accepted the responsibility for other peoples' education and welfare. Trade and the flag have both been followed by excellent citizens; the records of British India, for example, are full of most noble officers (though it unfortunately became fashionable for us to decry them long before the Russian leaders did so). These men were the salt of civilization, and it is to be noted that they thought of the governed as 'my people'—though it was not often put into words; though it is also true that these responsible administrators were often preceded or accompanied by self-seekers; it was the hangers-on who spoke of 'the natives'.

These public servants had an influence that extended beyond their district, whether it was in India, Africa or elsewhere; it was in Britain itself that their ideas were felt, and encouraged a sense of social responsibility to grow up and embrace many colours, races and religions; and this is still with us—though weaker. But now it is being seldom refreshed, for the scope and opportunities of such men are less, and less too is their influence on the fellow-countrymen. Here again, the vicious spiral is beginning to spin.

Is there any counter to these tendencies? No doubt there are several. One perhaps is paradoxically the fear of the hydrogen bomb. As Dr. Johnson said: 'if a man knows he is going to be hanged, it concentrates his mind wonderfully'.

#### THE SOCIAL REMEDIES

At this point, with a mushroom-shaped question-mark hanging in the air, we must pause and ask if there are any social remedies which we can ourselves find and use to increase the social responsibility of ourselves and our fellow-citizens—of this country and of the world. In spite of my gloomy pictures, I feel that there are, and that there is no cause for despair.

First, we must do more to improve the quality of parenthood; I do not mean, increase the birth-rate. We must try to inculcate the idea that we are no more born good parents than we are born good children. We must recognize that it is a skill and not just 'mother love'; factors which influence development are there to be studied, and a skill is there to improve with practice. No doubt we are teaching something at ante-natal clinics to prospective mothers, and fathers, but very little; it is perhaps significant that a very excellent book was recently published under the ironic title of *Fathers are Parents Too*. The irony is really that such a title is ironic; a book which was called *The Australians are Cricketers Too*, would be simply fatuous—or worse—in Australia.



Secondly, teachers must be selected and trained to be more secure than now, and more skilled. No doubt the recent awards will help; but can anyone feel that the average teacher's value to society is in any way reflected in his or her possible earnings. Teachers, if more secure, might be more prepared to learn from other professions: for example, the Training Within Industry courses, and others in certain firms, and the insistence on detailed market research of any product. I am, of course, here considering only the average: the best I know have little to learn.

Thirdly, there are already schools, notably the public schools, where teaching of social responsibility occurs; the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition would probably agree. But parents who wish to have their children benefitted by this (with perhaps some gain eventually to the State) are directly penalized by having not only to pay crippling fees—which they are prepared to see are necessary—but also to pay taxes to educate other people's children elsewhere. (Of course, on this last point I must 'declare my interest'; I have two children at school.)

Fourthly, we must do what we can, either as individuals or as members of professions, to influence public opinion and those who mould it, so as to increase a sense of social responsibility where we can—an uphill task. (There is, of course, a danger for members of my profession, of which I am very well aware, and realize I often fall into it, to make patients too dependent by doing too much for them; which is understandable enough, seeing that we often see people who for a time—and that is the point—do need support; it is easy to go on too long.)

We must try to get recognized those trends which decrease responsibility in childhood, adolescence, military service, work and leisure. But we must also ensure that the recognition of this does not lead to pontifical criticism, which will only lead to antagonism, but to criticism which is constructive and encouraging. ('No criticism without construction' would be another excellent slogan.) How this can be accomplished is another story.

## QUESTIONS

THE CHAIRMAN: It is always a great satisfaction to have proved a true prophet. I said that Dr. Tredgold would inform, delight and stimulate us and I am quite certain, Sir, that you have done all three of those things. In inviting questions, perhaps it will be helpful if we apply them in turn to different fields of Dr. Tredgold's lecture. I wonder, for instance, whether anyone would care to put a question on the passage which dealt with family relationships, then perhaps we might pass on to teachers and children.

MR. K. A. BOWDEN: Dr. Tredgold referred to a recent work on child development. Would he be kind enough to disclose the name of that book?

THE LECTURER: There is a Pelican book by John Bowlby, entitled *Child Care and the Growth of Love*, 1953. It is based on his report 'Maternal Care and Mental Health', which has been abridged and edited by Margery Fry.

THE CHAIRMAN: Would anybody care to raise a point about teachers? Dr. Tredgold said some rather challenging things about the sense of responsibility amongst teachers to-day, which perhaps somebody in the audience would like to discuss or combat.

Do you think there is great unease in the teaching profession? We hear very understandable agitation about salaries; is there any sense of insecurity in the respect in which teachers are held by the community?

THE LECTURER: I do not know if there are any of the teaching profession present, but I would be very interested to know how much the average teacher would feel it was part of his or her responsibility to inculcate a social responsibility in the children.

MISS J. H. LIDDERDALE: Has it a certain amount to do with the quality of the people who now go into teaching? Since the war there has been tremendous competition for graduates and, for various reasons, the calibre, at any rate the academic calibre, of graduates going into teaching is worse than the calibre of those going into any other type of employment.

THE LECTURER: So the teaching profession is getting the bottom of the barrel. Rather distressing is it not? I do not know whether you would be able to correlate absolutely their academic background with their social responsibility, but none the less it is possible that one could put it another way; they go into teaching because they cannot get anything else. If that is true to any extent it would be disastrous.

THE CHAIRMAN: Could it also be true that, because certain paper qualifications are insisted upon, a few with a real vocation for teaching, who have not the necessary academic qualifications, are no longer able to enter the profession, at least in the employ of local authorities? I think that may be so.

DR. LUCY MAIR: Does Dr. Tredgold think that the vocation for teaching is actually something which is so exceptional that it could not be expected to be found in the great majority of teachers; and if so, what should be done in a situation in which it is agreed that a great many more teachers are needed?

THE LECTURER: I would not have thought it was exceptional in that way, but I do not think we are necessarily looking for it always. The point made was that people are going into teaching without any vocation, which I think is disastrous. I just do not know whether the leaders of the teaching profession are setting out standards for teachers which include the ability to teach social responsibilities, but it looks from a bird's eye view from another profession as if that was not considered often, except in public schools. I do not see how it can really be considered very carefully because I should have thought it was extremely difficult indeed to set out to teach social responsibility in a class of the present size. This must have struck anybody who has thought about it at all and therefore either it is said 'we are not bothering about this, it is not our responsibility', or alternatively, 'we cannot do it'. And yet at the same time we increase the school-leaving age, which does not give us any more teachers over night. Is that a fair comment? But I have no right to go and criticise other professions here. If anybody wants to get up and criticise psychiatry in return it is all right by me!

THE CHAIRMAN: I often think of that remark of Herbert Spencer's, who I suppose was a pioneer in sociology (after all the word was not used I believe before 1840); Spencer said education has for its object the development of character. I think that is so often overlooked, it is equated with passing on information and its real essence is furthering the development of character.

THE LECTURER: As we get on with so-called civilization we are being asked to learn more and more facts, to get through more and more exams, and our standing in society depends much more on the facts we know than the people we are. That again is a trend the wrong way. I am sure it is true in the medical profession. One only hopes they will have the wit to forget all those facts later on, but that is at the moment the hall-mark of exams. I am sure Sherlock Holmes was right, you do not

want to fill your mind with that sort of thing; you only want to know where to look it up. However, I do not know that that is the way the examination system is tending; I think it is going the other way, we are tending to more and more insistence on facts and people fail not because of the way they think, but because they just do not happen to know certain facts.

THE CHAIRMAN: Is there any question about responsibility in business life that anyone would like to raise? Dr. Tredgold, I know you have been brought up many times against the problem that, whereas fifty years ago so much of business was in the hands of members of the owning family—who might not be very enlightened, but were at least brought up with the idea that they would have to take responsibility for the group of people working for them—we have now had the 'managerial revolution', and a great many people not born with that kind of instinct have, in fact, had to take a great deal of responsibility.

THE LECTURER: I would have thought there that industry was doing pretty well, setting its face toward the right path and trying very hard to inculcate leadership by teaching. The same problem applies to the services too, the army in a sense used to be run more or less by military families. That again has changed and the officer class (so called) is disappearing and many other people have had (during the war especially) to be trained to be officers without such a family background. It is a comparable picture and the services on the one hand and industry on the other have taken the plunge; they have seen that they have got to train whom they can; they have stopped talking about born leaders and they have started talking about training for leadership and with some hesitation they have buckled down to that. I think the courses for management are extremely good. On both sides I should have thought that the teaching for leadership was being accepted and I think that perhaps the teaching profession has something to learn in that way.

THE CHAIRMAN: Are there any points at all on international affairs? Do you think that enough is thought and taught and discussed about the responsibility of the already industrialized nations for the development of the so-called backward areas of the world? Have we been so vexed by our own problems and with the dollar shortage as well that we have not given as much thought as we might to that question I wonder? After the First World War we were all in a mood of optimism, joined the League of Nations Union, and thought the solution of world affairs was round the corner. When people spoke of the Second World War, we laughed it off as a nightmare that would never occur. In fact, a second worse war has taken place and one's zest for that kind of study of international problems and one's wish to help backward countries has understandably been checked.

THE LECTURER: It is interesting that that was correlated in time with the possession of a still very large empire and a large number of people were then still responsible for administration; I am perfectly sure they influenced public opinion a great deal. Now we are busily occupied in decreasing the empire (except for Rockall!) and we are doing this from the highest motives and the highest degree of social responsibility, but it must mean that there are less people who are actually carrying out socially responsible jobs elsewhere and therefore less influence on the community at large.

MR. J. A. JACKSON: Does the lecturer not think it is true there is a change in the type of social responsibility felt for the lesser developed countries over the last hundred years, a change perhaps towards an emphasis on material things, or economic efficiency or increased production rather than upon inculcating social responsibility through education as in the early missionary activity? I think definitely the emphasis should have some considerable consequence in terms of social responsibility.

THE LECTURER: Yes, I think that is true too.

MR. T. J. H. BISHOP: Could Dr. Tredgold inform us a little further in this sense: he gave some interesting reasons for the coming about of less social responsibility now, but I was not awfully clear on what evidence he based the idea and assumed that there is less social responsibility.

THE LECTURER: That is an absolutely fair criticism. I was trying my best to debunk that in advance because I have not got any evidence and I do not believe there is any; I do not know any yardstick, or any statistics and I am afraid I am depending entirely on impressions. If you remember, I said perhaps it was not fair to make recommendations without having evidence, but doctors had to. I think it is very difficult to collect statistical evidence. Have you any ideas as to how one might?

MR. BISHOP: No, my point was that it may be a very subjective thing, whether one believes this is so or not. For example, whether you think Lucky Jim was responsible or not presumably depends on whether you belong to the Morris-dancing, recorder-playing crowd.

THE LECTURER: I am afraid you have got me absolutely. I have to be judicial there and say 'who is Lucky Jim?'

MR. BISHOP: He is the central character in a novel by Kingsley Amis.

THE LECTURER: I agree it is subjective. I think it is very hard not to be subjective, of course, and the only thing I can do is to admit it and recognize my own subjectivity. On the other hand I think one has got to think in terms of trends and not in terms of evidence, but if I am right at all in my impression, then it is worth while thinking on the lines of how to counter those trends. If I am a hundred per cent right it is vitally important, if I am ten per cent right it is probably still worth while considering. It is a terribly suspicious argument I quite agree, and I think you are quite right to take it up. I realize the weaknesses, but what else can we do?

MR. K. A. BOWDEN: Might I ask Dr. Tredgold if his own profession is now agreed on the designation of certain types of mental illness? In discussing this subject what we really lack is statistical evidence; we can only begin to get this if the psychiatrists will classify their findings on a basis which is universally recognized in the profession. We can then see what is the size of the problem we are dealing with.

THE LECTURER: The answer to that one is that they have got a standardized classification. I do not think frankly it is a very good one, but it has been agreed and accepted by psychiatrists in this country, and that is therefore a step forward. I think maybe another step forward may take place in about ten years when they get a slightly better classification in the view of increasing knowledge, but they have got the best they can at the moment and we do agree about it.

The second point is that this does not mean you can measure it. It may be all very well for a set of doctors to agree about a classification, but it is quite a different thing to get a set of doctors to agree where a particular patient fits in that classification. That is a very much more complicated problem and doctors on the whole are individualists, so it is not easy to get to that; I hope that it will take shape. But even if you got all the psychiatrists to agree on that (which is very unlikely) you would still be faced with an enormous body of the population who are still suffering from psychiatric disorder but never see a psychiatrist at all; possibly they are recognized as psychiatric cases by their G.P., but very likely are not. So from the statistical point of view there are still about three major steps to take before we have got anywhere and that is perhaps one reason for my giving you no statistics to-night, though you are absolutely right to ask.

*A vote of thanks to the Lecturer was carried with acclamation, and the meeting then ended.*



## GENERAL NOTES

## ROYAL PHOTOGRAPHIC SOCIETY AUTUMN EXHIBITION

The exhibition, which was opened on Tuesday, 16th September, by Professor Sir Albert Richardson, K.C.V.O., President of the Royal Academy of Arts, contains 417 prints from 275 photographers. Of these 158 home exhibitors show 230 prints, while 117 from overseas have 187 prints hung. It has been customary for the entry from the United States to be very large but the interesting case this year is the evidence from Hong Kong and Malaya.

The technical quality of the prints is very high and Sir Albert pointed out in his opening address the vision of the photographer and the unusual range of subjects. He referred to the fact that the first President of the Royal Photographic Society was Sir Charles Eastlake, also holding the similar position of President of the Royal Academy. The camera had been a good friend to the artist, but 'woe betide any artist who used a photographic print as a basis for a painting'. One such work had been submitted to the Academy and was promptly rejected.

Apart from the prints there is a room for colour transparencies in various sizes and processes, almost 100 being two inches by two inches in Kodachrome, Ilfordcolor and Ferraniacolor, while some larger ones are in Ektachrome. Special projection evenings are set aside for the miniatures during September and October. Admission tickets may be obtained from the Secretary, Royal Photographic Society, 16 Princes Gate, S.W.7. Commentaries are to be given by leading workers in colour photography.

Upstairs in 'Q' Room are 18 colour prints in Agfa, Carbro and Dye Transfer, while stereoscopic colour transparencies are available in several cabinets alongside. It is amazing to see some of these three dimensional effects.

Advantage is taken of this exhibition to show also 18 of the prints in the permanent collection, one of them made in 1864 (*Autumn*, by Henry P. Robinson). There is also a carbro copy of an Albumen print made in 1860 of *The Two Ways of Life* by Rejlander, one of the most amazing composite studies ever made.

The exhibition will remain open at 16 Princes Gate, until 27th October, daily from 10 a.m. to 7 p.m. Admission is free. During the whole month of December it will be at the Usher Art Gallery, Lincoln.

E. W. M. HEDDLE

## BRAQUE EXHIBITION

The Exhibition of paintings by Georges Braque, which was shown in Edinburgh during the Festival and noticed by Mr. Nevile Wallis in his review of 'Art at the Festival', in the *Journal* for 14th September, will be on view at the Tate Gallery from 28th September to 11th November. Some additional paintings have been included for the London showing, making a total of 89 works. The Exhibition is open on Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays and Saturdays from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.; on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 10 a.m. to 8 p.m., and on Sundays from 2 to 6 p.m. Admission is 1s. 6d.

## UNITED STATES POST-WAR ARCHITECTURE EXHIBITION

An exhibition of buildings constructed in the United States since the war will open on 6th October at the Building Centre, Store Street, W.C.1, where it will remain until

27th October. The Exhibition, which has already been shown at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, illustrates by means of photographs, text, plans, and colour slides examples of architecture which have been selected by Professor Henry-Russell Hitchcock as the most significant of their period. It will be remembered that Professor Hitchcock lectured to the Society on Latin-American Architecture during the last Session. The Exhibition will be open on Mondays to Fridays from 9.30 a.m. to 5.30 p.m., and on Saturdays from 9.30 a.m. to 1 p.m. Admission is free.

## FROM THE JOURNAL OF 1856

VOLUME IV. 26th September, 1856

### THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION

*In the course of a lecture to the Lewes Mechanics' Institution, The Reverend Dr. Booth, F.R.S., Treasurer of the Society of Arts, said:*

Not only does the principle of competition govern the relative advancement of individual men in the same society, but nations, too, have entered on that course in their rivalry with one another. Who does not know that for years past the most strenuous exertions have been used to supplant the commerce of England, and that the most untiring efforts are being made to lower her manufacturing supremacy? If they have not hitherto been successful, it would be premature in us to boast that success shall never reward their perseverance. The life, the history of a nation is not measured by years but by centuries. We enjoy many advantages over continental nations in our vast capital and enormous commerce, in our facilities of transport, our numerous railways and multitudinous shipping, in the stability of our government, and the contentment of our people. But we have, on the other hand, many drawbacks in the general ignorance of our masses, in our overweening opinion of ourselves, in our obstinate resistance to change even when change would be a manifest and admitted improvement, in our apathetic tolerance of abuses, provided they are of long standing, and of 'Circumlocution offices', if the officials who 'show how not to do' are sufficiently respectable; these are the things which, let to run their course, will slowly but surely eat into the heart of the nation. Now such being the race that is set before us, whether nationally or individually considered, we have all of us, I believe, in these times of ours, come to consider that education based on sound instruction in those things with which we shall have more or less to deal through life, is one of the greatest if not the very greatest need of our time. Education is no luxury, it has become a necessary of life.